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| 1 |
ID:
134587
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| Summary/Abstract |
On November 24, 2013, after nearly two-and-a-half years of significant economic pressure on Iran by the United States and Europe, the two sides reached a Joint Plan of Action for six months (also referred to as the interim agreement). The agreement entered into force on January 20, 2014, and was extended for a period of four months in late July 2014.1 In return for a temporary and partial suspension of the American and European economic sanctions that had been imposed on it, Iran agreed to constrain its nuclear activity. Thus, Iran pledged to suspend its 20 percent uranium enrichment, convert half of its stockpile of 20 percent enriched uranium to oxide, and to dilute the other half to no more than 5 percent. Iran also agreed to refrain from installing additional centrifuges and increasing its stockpile of uranium enriched up to 5 percent by converting newly enriched uranium to oxide. Moreover, Iran consented not to transfer fuel or heavy water to the Arak nuclear site, to halt construction work on the site, and not to build a reprocessing facility capable of producing plutonium as a by-product.2
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| 2 |
ID:
134588
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The discovery of oil and natural-gas reserves in the Middle East at the beginning of the twentieth century changed the fate of the region. From a backwater of international politics, the Middle East became central to international strategic rivalries. Almost a century later, energy discoveries in the Eastern Mediterranean are unlikely to bring about such tectonic shifts in the strategic fortunes of the Levant. Yet they have generated a fresh interest in their potential impact on existing regional disputes and power constellations.
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| 3 |
ID:
134582
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The drift and incoherence of U.S. foreign policy under the Obama administration has not gone unnoticed in the Arab world and the Middle East, especially among America's Arab Gulf allies. Former U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia Chas Freeman could have been channeling Gulf elites when he said: “Americans no longer command the ability to shape trends in the Middle East. Almost no one expects us to do so.”1 The United States and its strategic allies in the Gulf have increasingly divergent visions of how regional politics should operate. The “marriage” between Washington and the Gulf has been long and beneficial to both sides, though not without its ups and downs. Neither side really wants a divorce, but Gulf elites increasingly worry that this episode of tensions is qualitatively different from those that came before. They fear that, this time, Washington not only disagrees with their view of the region, it does not care about their opinions, because America's strategic commitment to the Gulf, and the Middle East more generally, is no longer solid. For them, the “pivot to Asia” looks increasingly like a retreat from the Middle East. The renewed talk in American policy circles about “energy independence,” this time with more credible evidence to back it up, just adds to Gulf worries that Washington has downgraded the Gulf region and that the pivot is really a retreat.
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| 4 |
ID:
134592
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From its onset in 2011, the civil war in Syria has attracted foreign fighters from all over the world. Since around 2012, volunteers of North Caucasian origin, including Chechens, Dagestanis, Ingush and others have been at the forefront of international mujahedeen — a force of true believers of distinct backgrounds who have joined the war to advance what they consider to be the cause of Islam. When word spread of North Caucasians’ participation in the civil war, some praised their performance in combat, while others pointed to their excessive use of violence against civilians, a practice that has alienated thousands of ordinary Syrians. Like other mujahedeen groups engaged in the war, North Caucasian jihadists have experienced internal splits that have led to bloody infighting. According to some estimates, the North Caucasus has contributed the second-largest group of foreign fighters, following non-Syrian Arabs — a disproportionately high number relative to their demographics. As a result, what these fighters do and where they go after Syria represents a major security concern. If allowed to return to their homeland, North Caucasian jihadists — a committed and experienced force of hundreds of fighters with extensive contacts with jihadists worldwide — may pose an enormous threat to Russia's internal security.
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| 5 |
ID:
134586
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| Summary/Abstract |
The 2002 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on weapons of mass destruction in Iraq was a major intelligence failure, distorted by a pervasive policy climate that assumed that Iraq did indeed have active WMD programs, including nuclear weapons. What has remained unknown, however, is that intelligence assessments on Iran's nuclear program displayed the same systemic distortions that led to the Iraq WMD fiasco. As was the case in the errant Iraq estimate of 2003, two NIEs — in 2001 and 2005 — effectively reversed the burden of proof and reached the conclusion that Iran had been carrying out a covert nuclear weapons program in the absence of hard, verifiable evidence.
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| 6 |
ID:
134578
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With the latest round of Israel-Hamas hostilities giving way to a tense truce and cease-fire negotiations in Cairo, the Palestinian national-unity agreement has suddenly, and unexpectedly, become central to the thinking of all major players. What had looked strongly like a pro forma and essentially failed political initiative may be salvaged and transformed by the Gaza war into a centerpiece of the post conflict scenario. It will not, in reality and in the short term, involve full Palestinian political reunification. That would require a merging of the security and armed forces of the Palestinian Authority (PA) and Hamas and, in effect, the disarming of Hamas's paramilitary wing, the Qassam Brigades. There is no chance Hamas would agree to this unless the organization were truly broken, and nothing in the foreseeable future appears likely to achieve that result. However, a degree of Palestinian political transformation now appears possible.
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| 7 |
ID:
134580
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| Summary/Abstract |
Dr. Chomsky is [emeritus] Institute Professor in the Department of Linguistics and Philosophy at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He is the author of The Fateful Triangle: The United States, Israel and the Palestinians (1983). The following interview was conducted by Anne Joyce, editor of Middle East Policy, on October 18, 1984 (when the title of this publication was American-Arab Affairs).
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| 8 |
ID:
134590
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| Summary/Abstract |
On January 14, 2011, thousands poured into Habib Bourguiba Street, the symbolic heart of Tunis. They streamed in front of the Interior Ministry and broke through security barriers as they raced through downtown streets. Chanting and waving placards, they denounced the security forces and the party that had been in power since Tunisia's independence from France in 1956. The protesters called for karama (dignity), for hurriyyah (freedom) and for President Ben Ali to step down. By late afternoon, Ben Ali and his family had taken the presidential plane to Saudi Arabia, leaving the country in chaos and the government in shambles.
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| 9 |
ID:
134591
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| Summary/Abstract |
The invasion of northwestern Iraq by the Sunni-extremist Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL or ISIS) and the subsequent mobilization of Shia militias mark the latest challenge in Iraq's ongoing struggle to forge long-term stability. The primary driver of this crisis is not stagnating socioeconomic development or an acute lack of services, prominent issues in other countries in the region. Rather, it is a sectarian divide widened by political jockeying over national power sharing, and executive-level provocation of Iraq's Sunnis through opaque arrest campaigns and heavy-handed dispersals of protests. While ISIL's incursion reflects a confluence of political deficiencies and security fragility, the long-term solution to these challenges cannot be similarly confined to immediate military or political remedies. The government will not recover without undertaking steps towards reconciliation, through inclusive reforms, as well as maintaining and improving functionality for all of its citizens.
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| 10 |
ID:
134585
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Qatar has been one of the most active states during the Arab Spring. It has broadly supported the uprisings with media coverage on Al Jazeera, the Doha-based news channel, as well as with financial, diplomatic and material support for protagonists. Often Qatar threw its support behind Islamist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood to the extent that some kind of direct, intimate relationship was assumed to exist between the two.
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| 11 |
ID:
134584
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| Summary/Abstract |
When the government of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) issued a policy statement in April 20081 indicating that the country was seriously considering developing a civilian nuclear-power program, it set the region and the world speculating as to the possible motivations behind such a move at that time. Since that date, the UAE has aggressively forged ahead, signing bilateral agreements with nuclear-supplier countries while increasing cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in support of its bid to add nuclear power to its national energy portfolio. Most recently, the UAE has actually broken ground on its first and second reactors, in 2012 and 2013. At a time when the nuclear industry's “renaissance” has slowed or even faltered2 as a result of the 2011 Fukushima Daiichi accident, the global dynamics of the industry seemed to have little effect on the bold and confident pace of the UAE's nuclear plans. Worldwide, the future looks dimmer for nuclear than it did a few short years ago: Germany has pursued a policy of early decommissioning of its nuclear-power capacity;3 the Netherlands has adopted a “wait and see” attitude with respect to new nuclear plants;4 and new plants already under construction in China, France and Finland have experienced delays and cost overruns.5 Even in the face of these signs of a slowdown in the industry, however, the UAE continues to press ahead in its pursuit of nuclear power. Yet why should an oil-rich country like the UAE pursue a civilian nuclear power program, especially at a time when the future of nuclear-power around the world is uncertain?
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| 12 |
ID:
134575
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| Summary/Abstract |
We chose this topic when President Obama gave his speech at West Point in late May of this year. He did say that the United States would use force unilaterally if our core interests were directly threatened. But he emphasized a counterterrorism strategy that would rely upon supporting, training and working with security partners and announced a $5 billion program to support security partners in the Middle East, having identified terrorism as the most direct threat to the United States.
Not long after that, the Islamic State of Iraq in Syria moved down the Tigris River, and the Iraqi security forces retreated, raising the question of how much we can depend upon a strategy like that in Iraq or even in Afghanistan, where we will be leaving soon. He also said that Syria would be a major focus of this strategy. However, we've had a difficult time finding security partners there, because it's a very fragmented opposition and hard to vet and find moderates.
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