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| 1 |
ID:
135822
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines a secret Anglo-American programme, Project ‘E’, which equipped the RAF’s V-bomber Force with US nuclear weapons for use in wartime. It shows Project ‘E’ was ineffective as a warhead supply programme and, furthermore, that it crippled the operational effectiveness of the V-bomber Force as a whole between 1958 and 1962. This article argues that as a result of Project ‘E’, the V-Force was neither operationally nor politically independent as a nuclear deterrent force. This challenges the traditional view of the V-Force as the benchmark of nuclear independence to assess the Skybolt, Polaris and Trident programmes.
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| 2 |
ID:
182637
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| Summary/Abstract |
Novel long-range missiles, sensor technologies, and directed-energy weapons are rapidly disrupting the balance between offense and defense in modern warfare. It will probably become significantly more difficult to hide aircraft, ships, and vehicles on the battlefield as sensors improve and the cost premium for effective stealth increases. Hypersonic missiles threaten to make it more difficult to defend key assets using traditional means. However, sensor advances will aid both sides, and, if directed-energy weapons can be effectively developed and deployed, the trend could shift the other way, toward effective point defenses limited only by power and cooling. With multiple, potentially contradictory trends, the outcome for strategic stability remains extremely difficult to discern.
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| 3 |
ID:
182225
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| Publication |
Abingdon, RUSI, 2021.
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| Description |
iv, 104p.pbk
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| Standard Number |
9781032266671
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 060096 | 355.03/BRO 060096 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 4 |
ID:
161301
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| Summary/Abstract |
Heading into the Modernising Defence Programme (MDP) review process, the RAF has a force structure composed of assets that on a platform level are appropriate and relevant for the high-end state threat posed by Russia, while also being effective during overseas interventions. However, Justin Bronk argues that the force structure itself is too small to sustain attrition on any significant scale without rapidly running short of both aircraft and trained aircrew. While the RAF can, therefore, demonstrate the continuing relevance of its force structure in the new reality where deterrence against Russia is NATO’s key focus, questions remain about its sustainability in the unlikely but necessary planning scenario of a major war.
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| 5 |
ID:
155723
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| Summary/Abstract |
The fighter-bomber rose from obscurity in January 1941 to become the major component of the RAF’s Desert Air Force strike power by late 1942. This was a major shift in the way the RAF employed its aircraft. The tactical and technical factors that led to this change are crucial not only to understanding the course of the Second World War, but also to the history of airpower itself. In this article, Justin Bronk discusses how the fighter-bomber became the most important and practical component in the arsenal of a modern air force in terms of capability to project power on the battlefield.
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| 6 |
ID:
137946
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| Summary/Abstract |
At the root of the West's conventional military dominance lie investment in and the operationalisation of advances in science and technology (S&T). However, with the funding behind this long-held military edge now being scaled back as part of a wider austerity drive, it is ever-more important that governments invest their money wisely and that new technology is operationalised as effectively as possible. John Louth and Justin Bronk draw on interviews with policy-makers, industry figures and military personnel as well as novel-technology case studies to argue for the ‘operationalisation’ of uncertainty in the early design stages of capability planning, thereby allowing for the inclusion of mature technology at a much later date.
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