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| 1 |
ID:
135822
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines a secret Anglo-American programme, Project ‘E’, which equipped the RAF’s V-bomber Force with US nuclear weapons for use in wartime. It shows Project ‘E’ was ineffective as a warhead supply programme and, furthermore, that it crippled the operational effectiveness of the V-bomber Force as a whole between 1958 and 1962. This article argues that as a result of Project ‘E’, the V-Force was neither operationally nor politically independent as a nuclear deterrent force. This challenges the traditional view of the V-Force as the benchmark of nuclear independence to assess the Skybolt, Polaris and Trident programmes.
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| 2 |
ID:
135819
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| Summary/Abstract |
The task of coming to a proper appreciation of Clausewitz’s thoughts on war is to combine a hierarchical structure with that of a floating balance. This article examines the relation of purpose, aims and means in Clausewitz’s theory and highlights that this relation is methodologically comparable to the floating balance of Clausewitz’s trinity. Modern strategic thinking is characterised by the ‘ends, ways, means relationship’ and the concept of the ‘way’ as shortest possible direct connection between ends and means. If strategy is nothing else than the direct way of linking the political purpose with the means, understood as combat, this understandings results in ‘battle-centric’ warfare. My thesis is that the aim (goal, way) in warfare is not a direct link between purpose and means, but rather an indirect, intermediary dimension, a mediation (in Hegelian terms) between purpose and aims with its own grammar. This article distinguishes (sometimes going beyond Clausewitz) between the rationality of the whole process of war, the rationality of the separate aspects of purpose, aims and means in warfare and finally their conflicting tendencies. This article highlights Clausewitz’s different concepts of purpose and aims and tries to shed at least some light of the strategic implications of this difference. This interpretation of Clausewitz leads to the definition of strategy as maintaining a floating balance of purpose, aims and means in warfare.
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| 3 |
ID:
135818
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On War’s unfinished state has been a source of difficulties for interpretation for 180 years. By establishing a hierarchy of revision among the parts, we propose a criterion that can bring any part of On War in line with the most advanced stage of Clausewitz’s thinking. We exemplify the utility, illustrate the underpinnings and appreciate the potential of this criterion. We argue that the criterion offers the prospect of a shared, coherent, fully consistent and faithful rendering of Clausewitz’s theory of war.
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| 4 |
ID:
135825
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This is a short commentary on Dmitry Adamsky’s recent article ‘The 1983 Nuclear Crisis – Lessons for Deterrence Theory and Practice’. First, it teases out nuances in the relationship between deterrence and strategy and considers deterrence to be both a strategy and an effect. Second, it explores the culminating point of deterrence in theory and considers it untenable, as it does not conform to the logic of, or to any logic analogous to, Clausewitz’s culminating point of victory. Deterrence logically cannot culminate. Moreover, any culminating point of deterrence would ignore why the potential deteree should perceive the actions of his deterrer in such a way as to render strengthened strategies of deterrence counterproductive. It is the deteree who is the only strategic actor to determine whether the deterrer is actually practising a successful strategy of deterrence or not.
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| 5 |
ID:
135821
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| Summary/Abstract |
German grand strategy during World War II included making Europe independent of oil imported from sources controlled by the United Kingdom, the United States, and the USSR. The first step was to wrest control of oilfields. Producing and distributing the oil, however, required the creation of a company capable of replacing the evicted British, American, and Soviet suppliers. Therefore, in 1941, the Third Reich established the Continental Oil Company. Analysis of the company’s foundation and operations sheds light on the objectives of the Third Reich, including the postwar economic development of Axis Europe and the extension of German hegemony beyond the USSR into the Middle East.
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| 6 |
ID:
135815
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| Summary/Abstract |
A functional conceptualisation of morale is proposed, which focuses its meaning on motivation and the willingness to act rather than mood and group dynamics. Morale, it is argued, emerges from the subtle interrelationships of the many factors known to affect military means. It can be assessed both qualitatively and quantitatively, allowing the interaction between morale and policy to be explored in a manner that facilitates insight into the strategic process. A case study from the North African campaign of World War II is presented to explore in detail the relationship between morale and the art of war – strategy.
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| 7 |
ID:
135816
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How does morale relate to tactical and operational failure? Is it a cause or an effect? Using the Italian Army at Caporetto as a case study, this article explores the cyclical relationship between battlefield performance and morale. Combining quantitative analysis of army statistics with qualitative analysis of various official and private sources, this article analyses morale before the battle and during its opening phase. Italian morale appears surprisingly resilient and decisions to surrender or desert frequently relied on objective assessment of events rather than demoralisation. In this case it was battlefield defeat which turned disaffection into a full- scale morale crisis.
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| 8 |
ID:
135814
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| Summary/Abstract |
What makes soldiers fight? This question has interested historians since the dawn of war itself. The contributions of anthropology, psychology and sociology to the study of combat in the twentieth century have greatly deepened our understanding of morale and combat motivation. The publication of John Keegan’s seminal The Face of Battle in 1976, together with an upsurge of oral history, has stimulated a generation of scholarship on what Paul Kennedy has called ‘war from below’: individuals' experience of fighting.1 As a result, we know better than ever before what put the average soldier in his slit trench and kept him there.2 What remains poorly understood, however, is the connection between individuals' combat motivation, the morale of a unit or formation, and success and failure on the battlefield.
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| 9 |
ID:
135817
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The state of the German Army’s morale in 1918 is central to our understanding not only of the outcome of World War I, but also of the German Revolution and, indeed, through the pernicious ‘stab-in-the-back-myth’, on Weimar politics and the rise of the Nazis, too. This article presents new evidence from the German archives, blended with statistical analysis, to show that the morale of some units held up better than previously thought almost to the end, and thus to suggest three things. First, it proposes that some historians have placed too much reliance on English-language sources alone, such as British Army intelligence reports, which have various flaws as evidence. Second, it argues that, while historians have increasingly moved away from generalisations about German morale, this process has further to run. Third, it suggests that no single tipping point can be identified, and that morale alone does not provide a sufficient explanation for battlefield defeat. Indeed, much of the data can only be explained if the tactical realities of the war in late 1918 are clearly understood.
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| 10 |
ID:
135823
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Counter-insurgency scholars have long been familiar with Sir Robert Thompson’s classic work Defeating Communist Insurgency, which combined analysis of the insurgencies in Malaya and Vietnam with advice for counter-insurgents that emphasised the drawn-out nature of insurgency and the importance of focusing on population security. While historians have called attention to his role with the British Advisory Mission in South Vietnam and his later criticism of the US counter-insurgency campaign in Vietnam in his various books, less has been written about his subsequent role as a pacification advisor to the Nixon administration. This article explores Thompson’s relationship with Kissinger and Nixon and his views on the war in Vietnam from 1969 to 1974. An examination of Thompson’s thinking on Vietnam in the Nixon years reveals a theorist whose optimism on US prospects there was based on assumptions about elite and public patience for lengthy wars that were ultimately misplaced.
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| 11 |
ID:
135820
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article presents a new model for the development of Carl von Clausewitz’s thinking on the factors that constrain warfare. The model posits three stages in his thinking that are determined by two system theoretic dimensions. The three stages are friction as a constraint on the effectiveness of the execution of military plans on paper, suspension as a constraint on the intensity of military action and political objectives as a constraint on military objectives. The two dimensions consist of an interactive perspective in the form of causal feedback loops and a holistic perspective in the form of a political system that forms the context of the military subsystem.
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| 12 |
ID:
135824
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article explores the nature of the American war in Vietnam in an effort to determine whether it was a response to an indigenous uprising or an external effort by the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) to use a wide array of policies and programs to unite North Vietnam and South Vietnam under the party’s leadership. It argues that, although there initially were elements of the South Vietnamese population that rose against the southern leadership, the CPV gained control of their resistance and relegated it to a secondary role in the CPV war effort.
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