|
|
|
Sort Order |
|
|
|
Items / Page
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
135272
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Although some Middle Eastern countries, such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey, have tried to influence developments in Afghanistan from time to time, Iran—due to a long common history, geographic proximity, and cultural similarities—is by far Afghanistan's most important neighbor. In this article I seek to demonstrate that Iran, contrary to its image and often even more consistently than pro-Western countries such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey, has since 1979 acted in favor of an independent, centrally and moderately governed Afghanistan. Therefore, Iran will probably also be a stabilizing factor rather than a spoiler in every post–International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) scenario in Kabul.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 2 |
ID:
135270
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The economic, political, and social situation in post-2014 Afghanistan remains uncertain, particularly because the effects of the US drawback from Afghanistan on national and regional stability are rather difficult to foresee. In this article, we explore how the debates about post-2014 Afghanistan impact others' thinking. Afghanistan forces national governments and political leaders to reflect deeply on their policies toward Afghanistan and the wider region. Hence, the “Afghanistan problem” becomes a geopolitical imagery within other countries' discourse. Here we scrutinize the impact of post-2014 Afghanistan on South Korean and Chinese foreign policy practices, enabling us also to become familiar with Chinese and South Korean understanding of their political position in Asia.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 3 |
ID:
135273
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Despite a tense security situation, the uncertainties related to withdrawal of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), and the increased activities of its competitors (Pakistan and China), India has not substantially stepped up its security governance engagement in Afghanistan. In this article, I explain India's hesitant policy as a factor of domestic-level threat assessments, international pressures, and the risk-averse character of Indian foreign policy.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 4 |
ID:
135274
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
With US and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces poised for a major drawdown from Afghanistan in 2014, and Russia determined to strengthen its influence in the “near abroad,” new uncertainties face the volatile post-Soviet Central Asian states. Changing power alignments in the region will pose new challenges for the United States, Russia, China, and the European Union. This article assesses the evolving direction of great-power interaction and influence in Central Asia, focusing on Moscow's growing assertiveness in the region. Using a neoclassical realist framework, I argue that geographic, historical, and cultural ties; a military presence; and developing economic institutions favor Russia over the short term, although China is best poised to expand regional influence over the long run. US war weariness, budget constraints, and distance suggest that—barring new major terrorist threats emanating from the region—Washington's presence and influence will gradually diminish
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 5 |
ID:
135271
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Amid the reduction of US forces in Afghanistan, the search for solutions to the Afghanistan security conundrum calls for regional coordination. Despite limited achievements in the past, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) may be an important contributor to stability in Afghanistan. The SCO brings together powerful regional players (Russia and China) and important neighboring states whose strategic interests are intertwined in Afghanistan. All of them are potential stakeholders in providing regional solutions. In this article we suggest that the role of the SCO would lie in not only regionalizing Afghanistan policymaking but also promoting the country's integration into a regional framework of common interests.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|