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| 1 |
ID:
135965
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| Summary/Abstract |
ACCORDING TO FREEDOM HOUSE (2013),1 among countries with populations higher than 200,000, the proportion of electoral democracies is 56 percent (98/174) worldwide, whereas it is only 20 percent (10/49) in Muslim-majority countries. The average Freedom House score (1 for most and 7 for least democratic) for all countries (3.5) is also better than the average score for Muslim-majority countries (5.1). Analyzing countries with populations over 500,000, Polity (2010) reaches a similar result: 57 percent (93/164) of all countries and 28 percent (13/47) of Muslim-majority countries are democracies.2 Why is the rate (and score) of democracy disproportionately low among Muslim-majority countries? This article argues that the combined effects of rentier states and regional diffusion provide the best explanation.
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| 2 |
ID:
135966
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| Summary/Abstract |
IN THE SUMMER OF 2013, MORE THAN A YEAR before the filing deadline for congressional candidates in most states, political commentators were already conceding most races for the U.S. House of Representatives to one party or the other. Only about 10 percent of House races were deemed to be in play by the Cook Political Report and the Rothenberg Political Report, the two sources on which most political analysts rely for district-by-district assessments. Why were so few districts thought to be in play? One reason is because one party—in the vast majority of cases, the party not holding the seat in the 113th Congress—was unable to field a strong candidate. That explanation raises questions about why strong potential candidates who might be able to mount a viable campaign may be reluctant to throw their hats into the ring.
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| 3 |
ID:
135967
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| Summary/Abstract |
RAISE THE SUBJECT OF TAIWAN WITH ANYONE from the People's Republic of China (PRC)—whether the person is a government official or an ordinary citizen—and you will probably get a vehement and passionate articulation of China's sovereign claim to the island. But Taiwan is not just an emotional hot-button issue in China; rather, it is considered the PRC's most sensitive security issue.
Indeed, Beijing views Taipei as a major rival, or at least as posing a serious security threat. Certainly there are other political entities that China sees as rivals—the United States and Japan come swiftly to mind. It is easy to understand at a glance why Beijing would perceive Washington and Tokyo as rivals—in terms of the magnitude of the economic and military clout of each, as well as the geographic and demographic size of the United States and Japan. In contrast, to the casual observer, Taiwan would not seem likely to be perceived by China as a rival. The balance of power across the Taiwan Strait is extremely lopsided in favor of China. While the island is an economic dynamo and global trading power of considerable significance and possesses a credible defense capability, all these are dwarfed by the gargantuan capabilities of its cross-strait neighbor. Given this glaring asymmetry in the balance of power between China and Taiwan, why would Beijing characterize its relationship with Taipei as a rivalry?
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| 4 |
ID:
135968
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| Summary/Abstract |
ON 7 SEPTEMBER 2010, A CHINESE FISHING BOAT collided with two Japanese Coast Guard vessels near the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands within Japan's claimed exclusive economic zone. The Japanese Coast Guard detained the crew and ship but thereafter let them go, only to hand over the Chinese captain to prosecutors for obstructing its execution of duties. The Chinese government immediately protested to Japan and demanded the release of the captain. The situation only calmed down in late September when the Japanese government set the captain free but refused to apologize or give compensation.
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| 5 |
ID:
135964
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| Summary/Abstract |
AS IS WELL KNOWN, AMERICANS WITH HIGHER INCOMES tend to be more politically active than lower-income citizens. They vote more often, engage in more political discussions, attend more campaign events, contribute more money, and contact more public officials.1 But research to date has only examined the moderately affluent respondents that surveys of the general public are able to reach: the top 20 percent or 30 percent of income earners. What about really wealthy Americans, with incomes or wealth in the top 1 percent, who might potentially have a great deal of political influence? Do they—as resource-based theories would suggest2—participate at still higher levels than the merely affluent? Do they more often initiate contacts with high-level government officials? If so, about what? Matters of narrow economic self-interest or the common good (as they see it)? Answers to these questions may have implications for the workings of democratic politics.
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