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| 1 |
ID:
189682
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| 2 |
ID:
136413
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) Preparatory Commission launched a large-scale simulation of an on-site inspection in Jordan on November 3, 2014, to test the organization’s ability to find a nuclear test explosion site. The exercise, involving two fictitious countries, lasted for five weeks and used 150 tons of equipment to comb a large swath of land next to the Dead Sea.
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| 3 |
ID:
150333
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| Summary/Abstract |
The states-parties to the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) concluded the eighth review conference by adopting a final document that fell far short of what many sought and expected. Most of the participating countries viewed the results as a missed opportunity to advance measures to strengthen the legally binding accord that bans development, acquisition, and production of biological agents or toxins for possible weapons use.
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| 4 |
ID:
150299
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| Summary/Abstract |
Arms control experts attending the August preparatory committee meeting for the planned Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) review conference explored questions about how to adapt the accord in a time of accelerating scientific advances, emerging infectious diseases, and increasing risks of bioterrorism. They also considered international cooperation and assistance, export controls, and the possible establishment of a code of conduct.
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| 5 |
ID:
150301
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| Summary/Abstract |
Arms control experts attending the August preparatory committee meeting for the planned Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) review conference explored questions about how to adapt the accord in a time of accelerating scientific advances, emerging infectious diseases, and increasing risks of bioterrorism. They also considered international cooperation and assistance, export controls, and the possible establishment of a code of conduct.
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| 6 |
ID:
152054
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| Summary/Abstract |
Arms-control advocates have traveled a long road to end nuclear testing. Beginning with the US Baruch Plan and the Soviet Gromyko Plan in 1946, negotiations led to the signing of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996. Two decades later, a verification regime is up and running, with most of a planned 337 facilities installed around the globe and sending information to a data center in Vienna. Large-scale on-site inspection exercises in Kazakhstan, Jordan, and elsewhere have shown that the planned procedures work. What is missing? Of the forty-four countries that must ratify the treaty for it to enter into force, eight still must proceed with their national measures for ratification. How and why did the negotiators end up with such an unwieldy provision? How did they design such a complex international monitoring system so quickly? This article delves into a brief history of the treaty and its negotiations, highlighting some of the key and most contentious articles of the CTBT, painstakingly arrived at. These include the basic obligations, entry into force, and certain verification issues, including on-site inspections. It also examines the interface of science and technology with diplomacy and politics. Senior diplomats and world-renowned scientists convened in Geneva day and night to hammer out the complex issues involved in verifying compliance with a test ban. They devised a regime that has exceeded their expectations.
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