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| 1 |
ID:
136444
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| Summary/Abstract |
With the drawdown of US troops from both Iraq and Afghanistan, questions abound regarding the role of private military and security contractors (PMSCs) in American security policy moving forward. This article explores evolving US considerations for the use of various types of PMSCs currently and in the future. In doing so, it argues that the United States will continue to use PMSCs for the foreseeable future, although to a lesser extent than in the previous decade, and for different types of services in different theatres than was witnessed in Iraq and Afghanistan. In particular, it is likely that the US will use PMSCs specializing in security or training/consulting functions in place of US troops for external security support missions. The effects of this shift may be moderated by the private military industry’s increasing adherence to international regulatory standards, although it is likely that such regulations will have the greatest impact on those firms providing security services.
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| 2 |
ID:
148047
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| Summary/Abstract |
Historically, insurgency is one of the most prevalent forms of armed conflict and it is likely to remain common in the foreseeable future. Recent experiences with counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan offer many lessons for future counterinsurgents, but the discourse on the subject continues to be mired in a traditional dichotomy pitting population-centric approaches to counterinsurgency against enemy-centric approaches. Historical analysis suggests that this traditional dichotomy is not a sufficiently nuanced way to understand or plan for such operations. Instead, discussions of counterinsurgency should focus on two dimensions: actions (use of physical force vs. political or moral actions) and targets (active insurgents vs. insurgent support). This perspective divides the space of possible counterinsurgency efforts into four quadrants, suggesting that effective counterinsurgency campaigns find a balance of effort across the four quadrants that is well matched to the specific context.
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| 3 |
ID:
148048
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| 4 |
ID:
171646
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article analyses findings from an original survey of 187 private military contractors on their incentives for working in the industry. Perceptions of contractors as “greedy, ruthless, and unscrupulous mercenaries” shape both public and military opinions of outsourcing and may impact U.S. military effectiveness, civil–military relations, and contractor identity. We find that contractors are motivated by a range of factors and that their financial experiences are not clearly more positive than that of state military troops. We recommend broad education of military and defense officials and the public in the U.S. and other relevant nations, regarding the true incentives of modern-day, Western contractors, in an effort to dispel misperceptions, increase effective utilisation of contractors, and beneficially shape PMC-military coordination. DoD may consider integrating such training into its current efforts to improve outsourcing, including its Joint OCS Planning and Execution Course, pre-deployment fora, and curricula of advanced military studies schools.
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