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1 |
ID:
141646
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Summary/Abstract |
Why do political actors undertake reforms that constrain their own discretion? We argue that uncertainty generated by political competition is a major driver of such reforms, and test this argument using subnational data on Mexican states’ adoption of state-level access to information (ATI) laws. Examining data from 31 Mexican states plus the Federal District, we find that more politically competitive states passed ATI laws more rapidly, even taking into account the party in power, levels of corruption, civil society, and other factors. The fine-grained nature of our data, reflecting the staggered timing of elections, inauguration dates, and dates of passage, allows us to distinguish between different theoretical mechanisms. We find the greatest evidence in favor of an insurance mechanism, by which incumbent parties who face uncertainty over future political control seek to ensure access to government information, and means of monitoring incumbents, in the future in case they lose power.
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2 |
ID:
182676
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Summary/Abstract |
Tactical repertoires of mobilization and repression play an essential role in understanding dynamics of political violence, yet existing quantitative approaches focus primarily on intensities or counts of repressive actions. We focus instead on the diversity of repression, and demonstrate a novel method of measuring repertoires of state repression using event data. We show that more repressive states are likely to employ more diverse repertoires of repression, rather than specializing narrowly in particularly coercive tactics. We demonstrate that, globally, repertoires of state repression are growing less diverse over time. Finally, in the Online appendix, we model repertoires of repression across countries and over time, finding evidence of broader repertoires during protest and civil war, but narrower under democratic regimes and international human rights treaties.
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3 |
ID:
136613
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Summary/Abstract |
How might domestic regulatory institutions influence the adoption of global private regimes? We focus on the ISO 9001 and 14001 certification standards, which obligate firms to establish quality and environmental management systems. Previous research highlights the roles of international commercial audiences and national regulatory pressures as unconditional drivers of adoption. However, we argue that domestic regulatory institutions condition their effects—in opposite directions. Where regulatory institutions function well, firms facing high levels of regulatory pressure are more likely to seek ISO certification, but firms facing pressures from international audiences are less likely to do so. In contrast, weak regulatory institutions make export-oriented and foreign-owned firms more likely to seek ISO certification, but render firms facing high levels of regulatory pressure less likely to do so. We find support for our claims using firm-level data from 10,000 firms in 30 countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia.
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