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| 1 |
ID:
170117
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| 2 |
ID:
184100
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article seeks to investigate differences and similarities in how communist states respond to famine conditions, focusing on North Korea as a central case study. The purpose is to understand how North Korean government propaganda conceived of the reasons for, and the solutions to, the famine of the 1990s.
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| 3 |
ID:
136893
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China continues to support North Korea financially, but Pyongyang’s nuclear programmes and a series of cross-border incidents have led Beijing to be more vocal in its criticisms of its secretive neighbour. Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein investigates this changing approach.
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| 4 |
ID:
192228
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In this article, we trace the strategy of political control employed in North Korea under Kim Jong Un. Using conceptual tools created in the literature on comparative authoritarianism, we consider the roles of repression, co-optation, coercive distribution, and containment with respect to how the North Korean regime responds to external and internal threats. We focus on two areas as case studies in differentiated, contingent political control strategies. First, we consider the role of border as a conduit for unauthorized goods, migrants, and illicit information and the regime’s regulation of it. Second, we examine the regime’s management of internal economic actors, namely urban entrepreneurs and farmers. The main argument of this article is that Kim Jong Un has employed a policy of simultaneous co-optation, repression, and latterly under COVID-19, reemergent coercive distribution, building on but also modifying the strategic approaches pursued under Kim Jong Il.
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| 5 |
ID:
185975
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Current scholarship on marketization from below in North Korea emphasizes the increased influence of private actors, and portrays this process as eroding state control. While these accounts are largely accurate, they risk overlooking significant policy responses on the part of North Korea’s leadership. Over the course of the past decade, the regime under Kim Jong Un has actively pursued a political-economic model that attempts to institutionalize market activity under strengthened party-state political control. In doing so, the DPRK is hewing toward a model of “market Leninism” or “party-state capitalism” akin to that pursued by contemporary China and Vietnam, rather than that of the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe. By placing North Korea’s political economy in this framework, we can better understand the two key imperatives that have characterized Kim Jong Un’s rule: institutionalization of market mechanisms and strengthened political control.
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| 6 |
ID:
149664
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