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| 1 |
ID:
136899
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| Summary/Abstract |
In an era of rapidly evolving technological advances and ambitious potential adversaries, maintaining our beneath-the-waves advantage is a matter of ‘innovate or fall behind.’ In a June 2013 Proceedings article titled “Sustaining Undersea Dominance,” I outlined the submarine force’s strategy in terms of “People, Platforms, Payloads, and Partners.” The essential themes of that strategy remain intact and are serving us well. We continue to train and operate a force that deploys far forward with minimal external direction. We are building Virginia -class submarines, the world’s best attack submarines, at the steady rate of two per year in a program that is the national standard for delivering high quality, on time, and on budget. We are tracking to continue that success as we design the next generation of ballistic-missile submarines that will replace our Ohio -class SSBNs as they wrap up 42 years of service. We are developing new payloads to increase the reach of our submarines and the impact of our undersea-warfare partners in the surface, aviation, and mine-warfare communities. Our sailors achieve success on deployment, and when absolutely necessary turn around on very short notice for unscheduled deployments. We recently celebrated the 4,000th successful Ohio -class SSBN strategic-deterrent patrol. They prove every day that Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jonathan Greenert was right when he said that the undersea domain “is the one domain in which the United States has clear maritime superiority.”
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| 2 |
ID:
136903
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| Summary/Abstract |
Knowledgeable energetic-materials experts are retiring faster from naval warfare centers than they can be replaced. This trend must be reversed.
In July 2007, all F/A-18 aircraft were grounded across the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps when a rocket in the ejection-seat system of an F/A-18D parked at China Lake, California, activated. Dispatched experts found its propellant had destabilized and initiated in the cockpit at around 165 degrees Fahrenheit—a concern for naval aircraft in hot climates such as the Middle East. (Near- and long-term fixes are under development and being implemented.)
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| 3 |
ID:
136896
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| Summary/Abstract |
Those in charge of drawing up plans for a next-generation combatant need to make sure the chosen model lives up to expectations. Responding to now-outgoing Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel’s directive to the Navy in his Fiscal Year 2015 budget to “submit alternative proposals to procure a capable and lethal small surface combatant generally consistent with the capabilities of a frigate,” Navy leadership has proposed incremental changes in the existing hulls of the littoral combat ships (LCSs). 1 While the improvements in the “up-gunned” LCSs—announced in December—are welcome news to the vocal critics of the ships, those actions unfortunately do not reflect the vision or the necessary planning for the next generation of warships.
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| 4 |
ID:
136898
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| Summary/Abstract |
As the Navy modifies its next surface combatant, it would do well to learn from the mistakes made with the littoral combat ship.
The Navy’s littoral combat ship (LCS) has undergone a stream of criticism since its inception in 2001. Instead of slowly diminishing, the criticisms—from Congress, the Government Accountability Office, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and even within the Navy—continued and grew more serious. In a February 2014 memo, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel confirmed what had been leaked in January: Instead of a planned fleet of 52 LCSs, “no new contract negotiations beyond 32 ships will go forward.” In the memo, he directed the Navy to submit proposals for alternative small surface combatants “generally consistent with the capabilities of a frigate.”
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| 5 |
ID:
136897
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Navy needs a practical platform—one that is economic and adaptable—to fulfill its missions. Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. Navy has faced few challenges to its core missions of projecting power ashore, forward presence, and sea control. A relatively benign threat environment and the legacy of the 1980s build-up allowed the Navy to effectively conduct a range of additional missions from traditional maritime interception and counter-piracy to supporting theater security cooperation efforts and providing humanitarian relief. Unfortunately, its ability to continue conducting these missions is being tested by two trends: the spiraling cost of new platforms and the return of credible threats.
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| 6 |
ID:
136900
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| Summary/Abstract |
Shipboard rituals have a place at the helm when it comes to how skippers should be treated by their subordinates. It’s all in the authority that comes with nautical lore.
One evening in 2010, the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Grand Isle (WPB-1338) let go her anchor in Salem Harbor, Massachusetts, to pass the night. At 29 years old and with 7 years of sea duty under my belt, I was the captain of the vessel and responsible for her successful operation and the safety of the crew of 17. As the anchor line paid out, the cutter drifted astern with the current at a good pace. Normally we help set the anchor by ordering a quick shot of astern propulsion—yet this time it wouldn’t be necessary. I instructed the conning officer to withhold the normal shot of backing bells. Instead of the expected “aye, aye” response, I received a perplexed look and the question, “why?”
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| 7 |
ID:
136901
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To counter China’s recent actions and maintain stability in the Western Pacific, the United States must find an effective strategy—soon.
China is implementing a well-designed cost-imposing strategy in the Western Pacific that is inexorably undermining the position of the United States and its partners in the region. We need a competitive response if we are to maintain peace and stability in an area the Obama administration has made a top priority for U.S. security planning. 1
Policymakers faced with an emerging and perhaps ambiguous threat must make two assessments. First, what military capacity might the potential adversary eventually develop? And second, what are the potential adversary’s intentions? Is it at least plausible that the opponent could put at risk the United States’ goals and interests? Policymakers are wise to keep their attention focused first on the adversary’s future capacity for military action for the simple reason that intentions can change rapidly and unexpectedly. Benign intentions today can become malign actions tomorrow. But those actions only become a problem if the adversary has the military capacity to carry them out.
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| 8 |
ID:
136902
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| Summary/Abstract |
Cost overruns in the billions, construction fiascoes, and a vexing dearth of oversight—welcome to the troubled world of Navy ship contracts.
With nearly 300 active ships, the U.S. Navy is by far the world’s largest—larger, in fact, than the next 13 navies combined. Although the Navy does operate its own shipyards, they are not equipped to handle all of the maintenance and repair requirements to maintain a Fleet of this size. Therefore, given the oscillating requirements for ship-repair work, the Navy routinely contracts out a portion of its ship-repair work during peak workloads. This process has benefited the Navy by acquiring technology and management skills that it might not otherwise possess while maintaining a fully employed and qualified workforce. However, if the Navy fails to provide proper quality oversight and a contractor is not effectively monitored, the results can be devastating to the government.
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