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ID:
025466
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| Edition |
1st ed.
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| Publication |
New Delhi, Cosmo Publications, 1983.
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| Description |
xiv, 380p.hbk
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 022045 | 954.163/CHO 022045 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 2 |
ID:
181744
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| Summary/Abstract |
Recent research suggests that civilian defense forces (CDFs) – a distinct type of pro-government militia – can help states suppress insurgent movements. Considering the potential benefits, it is understandable why governments would want to use them. However, viewed from the perspective of civilian recruits, militia duty is a perilous side job that pays very little. So, why do civilians sign up to serve in them? This paper argues that civilian private agendas play a major role in facilitating the recruitment of CDFs. Because private agendas are difficult to observe directly, I examine their impact indirectly by identifying tribal groups as a population segment with particularly strong private incentives stemming from intertribal feuds and the concomitant desire to gain an upper hand relative to local rivals. The argument is tested on a novel province-level data set of CDF deployments in Turkey and the Philippines. Statistical analyses of these data show that states recruit over 50 percent more CDFs in regions with even modest tribal presence than in comparable areas without any tribal populations. These findings suggest that private agendas play a significant role in motivating militia recruitment. Private agendas thus help governments to combat macro-level insurgent movements by exploiting micro-level social tensions. The research also sheds light on the makeup of recruits and points to intensification of civilian disputes as likely ramification of CDF deployment in counterinsurgency campaigns.
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