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| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
137100
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| Summary/Abstract |
This essay examines a highly significant but little known incident—the “Campbell affair”—during the first six months of Winston Churchill’s premiership (May–October 1940). As the Battle of Britain raged, an equally important campaign was waged between the Air Ministry and the new Ministry of Aircraft Production, headed by the bumptious Canadian-born peer, Lord Beaverbrook. Corrosive remarks by Beaverbrook, which were reported to Canada’s mercurial premier, W. L. Mackenzie King, and then relayed back to London by Sir Gerald Campbell, Britain’s high commissioner in Ottawa, threatened not only to unhinge Anglo-Canadian wartime relations at a pivotal juncture of the war, but also to jettison the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan.
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| 2 |
ID:
137101
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article looks at the failure of the Japanese Army and Navy to use Hong Kong to control the South China coast between 1942 and 1945. This was the result of their inability to cooperate at the strategic and operational levels and also of their shortage of resources. In addition, the flawed shipping-protection tactics adopted by the Japanese Navy, the incomplete control of the Japanese forces over the South China coast, and the resistance of Allied guerrilla and intelligence units, all helped prevent Hong Kong from becoming a useful base for the Japanese. The Japanese sought to dominate the South China Sea through a huge land offensive, but the costly campaign did not alter the course of the war.
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| 3 |
ID:
137102
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After World War II, the colonial government in the Netherlands East Indies (NEI) prosecuted more than 1,000 Japanese nationals for war crimes committed against mostly Dutch and Indonesian citizens during the Japanese occupation of the NEI (1942-1945). This article examines the unique Dutch approach to prosecuting war crimes at so-called “Temporary Courts-Martial,” including the applicable rules governing evidence, jurisdiction, and punishment. It also looks at representative war crimes trials by offense and analyzes death and non-death sentences imposed by the tribunals. Finally, it offers some overall conclusions about these trials in military legal history.
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| 4 |
ID:
137104
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| Summary/Abstract |
As the Saigon government collapsed in 1975, the U.S. military evacuated more than 100,000 Vietnamese to the United States. Framed by congressional distrust of military action, the shift to the All-Volunteer Force, and the integration of women into the armed forces, this refugee operation marked a turning point in how the U.S. military perceived humanitarian operations. “Military” and “humanitarian” work co-existed in an uneasy balance, yet over time, operations that might be seen as routine, or even feminized, gained political value. Defining the 1975 Vietnamese evacuation as humanitarian thus became a telling precedent in the military’s growing scope of operations.
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| 5 |
ID:
137103
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| Summary/Abstract |
During the Cold War, U.S. intelligence agencies spared no effort to get tactical and strategic information about Finland and its neighbors in order to route bombers and missiles over Finland, to select targets for nuclear strikes, and to plan coastal landings. Especially during the last years of the Cold War, Finnish military intelligence secretly channeled information to the Americans without notifying Finland’s political leadership. Washington gave the Finns military information on Soviet bloc countries on a quid pro quo basis. Although Finland was bound to the Soviet Union by a friendship treaty of a military nature, it seems that the Finnish armed forces actually were prepared to fight the Soviets alongside the West.
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| 6 |
ID:
137099
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Continental Army entrusted many of its junior officers with a great degree of responsibility and autonomy. Captain Henry Lee’s role in commanding a vital foraging operation in Delaware and Maryland for the Main Army at Valley Forge in February and March 1778 sheds light on the role of a company-grade officer within the broader framework of petite guerre. Lee demonstrated his ability at planning and executing autonomous operations and proved himself a capable, thoughtful, and energetic officer in an important, but overlooked expedition that reveals something of the important operational middle ground occupied by American company-grade light officers.
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