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ID: 137117

Information and institutions Redux: a response to Fey, Jo, and Kenkel / Chapman, Terrence L; Pascoe, Henry

Chapman, Terrence L	Article
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In “Information and Institutions Revisited,” Fey et al. point out some corrections to the equilibrium analyzed in Chapman. In this brief response, we argue that while these corrections are appropriate, they do not address the larger substantive question of when conditions exist that would facilitate information transmission between an international security organization and a domestic audience. We show an equilibrium in which the core logic of the information transmission argument in Chapman remains. We also discuss the particular modeling choices that facilitate information transmission (or prevent it) in equilibrium.

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ID: 155188

Sanctions and preventive war / MaCormack, Daniel; Pascoe, Henry

Pascoe, Henry	Journal Article
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In this article, we demonstrate that through their use as tools of military containment, sanctions play an unappreciated role in international politics. We show that sanctions can be used to smooth shifts in relative power that would otherwise lead to preventive war. After presenting a model of shifting relative power and sanctions, we discuss two cases in which sanctions were imposed to destroy an adversary’s military capability. We also explore the implications of this argument for the evaluation of sanctions’ effectiveness. Because sanctions may be deployed as a mechanism to lock in the status quo rather than revise it, the outcome of a sanctions episode must be compared to its counterfactual rather than the status quo ante. Our argument suggests that sanctions may be effectively deployed in response to expected adverse shifts in relative power; therefore observed outcomes disadvantageous to the sanctioning state are insufficient proof that sanctions have failed.

Key Words

Economic Sanctions ; Game Theory ; Interstate Conflict ; Bargaining

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