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| 1 |
ID:
190452
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| Summary/Abstract |
Greece was never internationally renowned for its defence industry; in fact, its state-owned industries were usually a source of headaches rather than income for Athens. The Debt Crisis (2008-18) compounded the chronic ills of the Greek defence ecosystem which appeared to decline irreversibly. And yet, in recent years they rebounded and reached new heights. How can this surprising turnaround be explained? And what does it indicate for the future of the Greek defence industry? This paper aspires to examine how the Greek defence ecosystem (state- and private-owned) evolved from a stage of stagnation and decline into a phase of stabilisation.
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| 2 |
ID:
146230
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| Summary/Abstract |
Since control over the population constitutes the most crucial determinant for victory in irregular warfare, how should a state authority isolate the insurgents (the “fish” in Maoist terms) from the population (the “sea” in which the “fish” thrive)? Should a state authority simply drain the “sea” by diverting its “water” elsewhere? Does the forcible transfer of the local people who support an insurgency truly work? This article studies how the royalist regime of Greece forcibly transferred thousands of villagers (over 10% of the total population) to counter the communist insurgency during the Greek Civil War (1946–1949) and shows whether and how these deportations could be crowned with success.
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| 3 |
ID:
137162
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How does an established state authority respond to an insurgency? How does such an authority plan and carry out its struggle to counter an armed non-state actor and why? The issue of strategy in counterinsurgency (COIN) remains a rather contentious subject and several practitioners and theorists on COIN have prescribed various remedies to the same problem. This article offers a re-evaluation of the concept of strategy in COIN and outlines the practices and mentalities that counterinsurgents should adopt (and avoid) to successfully counter an insurgency.
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| 4 |
ID:
154172
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| Summary/Abstract |
By June 2016, the Kurds of Syria (just 12 percent of the country's total population) controlled almost all of the 822-kilometer Turkish-Syrian border and advanced against Manbij and Raqqa — the Islamic State's resupply center and capital, respectively. How did the Syrian Kurds grow from pariahs to kingmakers in northern Syria? This essay surveys the strategy of the Democratic Union Party (PYD), the most powerful organization among the Syrian Kurds, from 2011 until the first half of 2016, and shows how the PYD's realpolitik secured the party's survival and, eventually, success in the midst of a vicious sectarian civil war.
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