Query Result Set
Skip Navigation Links
   ActiveUsers:1400Hits:19402246Skip Navigation Links
Show My Basket
Contact Us
IDSA Web Site
Ask Us
Today's News
HelpExpand Help
Advanced search

  Hide Options
Sort Order Items / Page
MURTAZASHVILI, JENNIFER (2) answer(s).
 
SrlItem
1
ID:   152308


Coercive capacity, land reform and political order in Afghanistan / Murtazashvili, Jennifer; Murtazashvili, Ilia   Journal Article
Murtazashvili, Jennifer Journal Article
0 Rating(s) & 0 Review(s)
Summary/Abstract This article compares four historical periods in Afghanistan to better understand whether land reform in the post-2001 context will improve prospects for political order. Its central finding is that political order can be established without land reform provided that the state is able to establish and maintain coercive capacity. However, the cost of establishing political order mainly through coercion is very low levels of economic development. We also find that when land reform was implemented in periods of weak or declining coercive capacity, political disorder resulted from grievances unrelated to land issues. In addition, land reforms implemented in the context of highly centralized political institutions increased property insecurity. This suggests the importance of investing in coercive capacity alongside land reform in the current context but also that establishing inclusive political institutions prior to land reform will increase its chances of success.
        Export Export
2
ID:   137236


Gaming the state: consequences of contracting out state building in Afghanistan / Murtazashvili, Jennifer   Article
Murtazashvili, Jennifer Article
0 Rating(s) & 0 Review(s)
Summary/Abstract The operation of a vibrant illicit economy and government corruption are widely acknowledged as obstacles to the post-conflict reconstruction of Afghanistan. However, massive influxes of money tied to the international efforts have led to ‘legal’ corruption that similarly obstructs state consolidation and peace. This paper considers the various ways in which Afghan entrepreneurs have learned to ‘game the state’ by taking advantage of donor and especially US procurement systems since 2001. The conceptual framework and evidence suggests that designing ways to limit corruption arising from the state-building process is key to improving the long-run prospects for post-conflict reconstruction in Afghanistan and similar states where rapid and steep increases in foreign aid and associated contracts create fertile ground for malfeasance.
Key Words State Building  Afghanistan  Corruption  Lobbying  Contracting 
        Export Export