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Modern View
SECURE SECOND STRIKE
(2)
answer(s).
Srl
Item
1
ID:
151233
Importance of power balance in nuclear arms negotiations: an addendum
/ LaMar, Casey
LaMar, Casey
Journal Article
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Summary/Abstract
Theorists debate whether symmetry or asymmetry of the power balance can help bring about bargaining success. Arbitration is difficult because the ‘Symmetry Theory’ accepts Structuralist theoretical conventions, while the ‘Asymmetry Theory’ rejects such conventions. This article employs a ‘Nuclear Weapons Addendum’ to strengthen the Asymmetry Theory by allowing it to explain bargaining results in symmetric and asymmetric cases without dismissing Structuralist assumptions. We analyze comparative case studies of the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty to argue that this modified Asymmetry Theory provides a more convincing narrative that should be considered in Structuralist discussions of international negotiation.
Key Words
Nuclear arms
;
International Negotiation
;
Power Balance
;
Secure Second Strike
;
Nuclear Weapons Addendum
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2
ID:
137242
Stalking the secure second strike: intelligence, counterforce, and nuclear strategy
/ Long, Austin; Green, Brendan Rittenhouse
Long, Austin
Article
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Summary/Abstract
Secure second strike nuclear forces are frequently held to be easy to procure. Analysts have long argued that targeting intelligence against relocatable targets like submarine launched and land mobile ballistic missiles is difficult to obtain. However, the scholarly consensus on intelligence for counterforce operations is seriously overdrawn. Both during and after the Cold War, the United States developed substantial intelligence capabilities to track and target submarines and mobile missiles. These efforts achieved important and under-appreciated success. Second strike forces have been far more vulnerable than most analysts are willing to credit.
Key Words
Nuclear Strategy
;
Intelligence
;
Counterforce
;
Mobile Targets
;
Secure Second Strike
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