| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
139526
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Existing research on the legitimacy of the UN Security Council is conceptual or theoretical, for the most part, as scholars tend to make legitimacy assessments with reference to objective standards. Whether UN member states perceive the Security Council as legitimate or illegitimate has yet to be investigated systematically; nor do we know whether states care primarily about the Council's compliance with its legal mandate, its procedures, or its effectiveness. To address this gap, our article analyzes evaluative statements made by states in UN General Assembly debates on the Security Council, for the period 1991–2009. In making such statements, states confer legitimacy on the Council or withhold legitimacy from it. We conclude the following: First, the Security Council suffers from a legitimacy deficit because negative evaluations of the Council by UN member states far outweigh positive ones. Nevertheless, the Council does not find itself in an intractable legitimacy crisis because it still enjoys a rudimentary degree of legitimacy. Second, the Council's legitimacy deficit results primarily from states' concerns regarding the body's procedural shortcomings. Misgivings as regards shortcomings in performance rank second. Whether or not the Council complies with its legal mandate has failed to attract much attention at all.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 2 |
ID:
172823
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Several conflict studies explore material factors connected to state performance (e.g., growth and Gross Domestic Product per capita). Recently, georeferenced conflict research has linked local economic factors such as subnational wealth and intrastate inequality to conflict. However, few studies concern the people’s perceptions. More specifically, existing studies neglect the effect of performance legitimacy, understood as the people’s evaluations of presidential performance. This study argues that systematic focus on subnational variation of presidential performance legitimacy contributes to a deeper understanding of conflict occurrence. This is because objective indicators of performance such as economic wealth differ from actual perceptions of performance. The hypothesis is investigated with survey data from the Afrobarometer rounds 2–5 covering thirty-four countries and 376 first-order administrative units. These data are merged with georeferenced data from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED) and the Peace Research Institute Oslo-Grid dataset (PRIO-GRID). The results show that high levels of performance legitimacy in a province decrease the expected number of conflict events the following year. Future conflict studies should therefore include perceptions on a substate level.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 3 |
ID:
137364
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Theories that explain post-Mao China's economic success tend to attribute it to one or several ‘successful’ policies or institutions of the Chinese government, or to account for the success from economic perspectives. This article argues that the success of the Chinese economy relies not just on the Chinese state's economic policy but also on its social policies. Moreover, China's economic success does not merely lie in the effectiveness of any single economic or social policy or institution, but also in the state's capacity to make a policy shift when it faces the negative unintended consequences of its earlier policies. The Chinese state is compelled to make policy shifts quickly because performance constitutes the primary base of its legitimacy, and the Chinese state is able to make policy shifts because it enjoys a high level of autonomy inherited from China's past. China's economic development follows no fixed policies and relies on no stable institutions, and there is no ‘China model’ or ‘Beijing consensus’ that can be constructed to explain its success.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|