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WU, TIAN (3) answer(s).
 
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1
ID:   183072


Contribution of China's online car-hailing services to its 2050 carbon target: Energy consumption assessment based on the GCAM-SE model / Wu, Tian   Journal Article
Wu, Tian Journal Article
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Summary/Abstract As online car-hailing services in China have matured and gained legitimacy as a traffic business activity supported by national policies, they have exceeded the expected speed of development. This paper estimates the extent to which online car-hailing services will affect China's energy consumption and carbon emissions under several scenarios. To weigh the substitution effect of online car hailing toward China’s 2050 environmental goals, a Global Change Assessment Model 4.0-Sharing Economic (GCAM-SE) is used to analyze and associated government policy. Results indicate that by 2050 China's online car-hailing will achieve emission reductions of 8.36, 14.51, and 95.66 MTCO2 under, respectively, strict, moderate, and non-strict levels of the national Preliminary Rules on the Management of Online Car Hailing (PRMOCH). In 2015–2033, strict PRMOCH can better reduce energy consumption and carbon emissions by controlling the number of online car-hailing services, as compared to non-strict PRMOCH. After 2033, online car-hailing services will automatically realize the emission reduction function, whereas in this study's scenarios 1 and 2, the PRMOCH will hinder realizing car hailing's intended emission reduction function. These results strongly suggest the policy for online car hailing will be counterproductive unless policy makers consider the difference between the PRMOCH validity period and invalidity period.
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2
ID:   150064


How hyperbolic discounting preference affects Chinese consumers’ consumption choice between conventional and electric vehicles / Wu, Tian; Shang, Zhe ; Tian, Xin ; Wang, Shouyang   Journal Article
Wang, Shouyang Journal Article
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Summary/Abstract This paper presents a theoretical model and addresses several issues related to life cycle cost analysis to illustrate how time-inconsistent preferences affect consumer choice. The particular case study selects involved consumer choice between a vehicle with high initial acquisition cost but low ownership cost (e.g., an Electric Vehicle, EV) and one with a low initial acquisition cost but high ownership cost (e.g., a conventional Internal Combustion Engine Vehicle, ICEV). To test our theoretical analysis, we conduct an empirical study on how time discounting rates affect consumer choice between ICEVs and EVs with different initial cost ratios. From the survey results, we find that individuals with higher present bias showed irrational purchase behavior even when controlling for wealth level. Specifically, people making some “stronger bias to present” decisions chose higher total cost ICEVs with lower initial cost but higher ownership cost over lower total cost EVs with higher initial cost and lower ownership cost. However, people’s long-term discount is not correlated with irrational vehicle purchase behavior. Furthermore, we study the present bias and long-term discount rate in one scenario and found present bias to be correlated with irrational behavior.
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3
ID:   137691


Setting up charging electric stations within residential communities in current China: gaming of government agencies and property management companies / Wu, Tian; Ma, Lin ; Mao, Zhonggen ; Ou, Xunmin   Article
Ou, Xunmin Article
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Summary/Abstract The difficulty of charging electric vehicles (EVs) is now hindering their further development. Governments generally choose to build stations for home charging (including piles) within residential communities. Given the conflict of interest between various government agencies and property management companies, constructing a charging station within residential communities would result in welfare loss for the property management companies and therefore lead to the principal–agent problem. This paper constructs a two-period imperfect information game theory model to study the moral hazard involved in this issue and government agencies׳ optimal choice. In the analytic solution of the model, we find that the optimal choice for a farsighted government agency is to constantly improve the incentive mechanism and introduce charging stations only when the conflict of interest is eliminated. Any benefits derived from government regulations by force would prove short-lived. The government should focus on long-term returns in the development of EVs, and its optimal mechanism should be designed to mitigate the principal–agent problem of property management companies, thereby accelerate the progress of EV charging infrastructure and improve overall social welfare.
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