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ID:
137753
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| Summary/Abstract |
Kenya’s invasion of southern Somalia, which began in October 2011, has turned into an occupation of attrition – while “blowback” from the invasion has consolidated in a series of deadly Al-Shabaab attacks within Kenya. This article reviews the background to the invasion, Operation Linda Nchi, and the prosecution of the war by Kenya’s Defence Forces up to the capture of the city of Kismayo and the contest to control its lucrative port. The second section discusses Al-Shabaab’s response, showing how the movement has reinvented itself to take the struggle into Kenya. We conclude that while the military defeat of Al-Shabaab in southern Somalia seems inevitable, such a victory may become irrelevant to Kenya’s ability to make a political settlement with its Somali and wider Muslim communities at home.
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| 2 |
ID:
164619
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| Summary/Abstract |
Kenya embarked on its first foreign military operation in 2011–2012: Operation Linda Nchi (Protect the Nation) involved operations in Somalia targeting al-Shabaab. Kenya has long been an economic and political bastion of Western support. Moreover, Kenya’s military, the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF), has been a recipient of much Western arms, aid, and training over the years. But how effective were KDF counterinsurgency operations, particularly its use of air power against al-Shabaab? Through a detailed case study, it will become clear that Operation Linda Nchi was poorly planned and the KDF, ill-prepared for its war against al-Shabaab.
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