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ID:
179375
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| Summary/Abstract |
The ‘weaponisation’ of artificial intelligence and robotics, especially their convergence in autonomous weapons systems (AWS), is a matter of international concern. Debates on AWS have revolved around (i) the identification of hallmarks of AWS with respect to other weapons; (ii) what it is that makes AWS destructive force especially troublesome from a normative standpoint; and (iii) steps the international community can take to allay these concerns. Of particular concern is the need to preserve the ‘human element’ in the use of force. A differentiated approach to this latter issue, which is also principled and prudential, may pave the way to a legally binding instrument to regulate AWS by establishing meaningful human control over all weapons systems.
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| 2 |
ID:
137767
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| Summary/Abstract |
Moving from the assumption that judicial abdication in foreign affairs represents a major hurdle to domestic implementation of international law (and thus to its effectiveness), the present article investigates its legal and prudential foundations, having particular regard to the political question doctrine (or political act doctrine, in civil law parlance). A comparative analysis reveals the threefold nature of these doctrines, to the extent that they operate either as a jurisdictional limitation, or as a non-justiciability argument, or as a form of prudential self-restraint. Each of these aspects will be discussed in detail in order to demonstrate a) that all the arguments employed to justify judicial abdication are devoid of grounds or overestimated; and b) that more viable solutions are available with a view to balancing judicial control and political prerogatives in foreign affairs cases.
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