| Summary/Abstract |
During the 1950s, Canada and the United States worked together to develop a North American air defence system. While the military cooperation generally worked well, some difficulties did occur. These problems in the relationship were almost always the result of concerns from within the Canadian government and the Department of External Affairs that the air defence measures posed political problems and were a threat to Canada’s sovereignty. In the fall of 1954, opposition to further improvements to the continental air defence system emerged from a different source: General Charles Foulkes, the chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. He believed that radioactive fallout from ground bursts of thermonuclear weapons in a war with the Soviet Union would pose insurmountable problems for the air defence effort. Thus, the countries needed to conduct a joint reappraisal of the air defence problem. This article will explore Foulkes’ position and examine what lessons can be drawn from this experience.
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