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| 1 |
ID:
137065
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines the destabilizing impact of rapid-onset, climate-related disasters. It uses a sample of storms and floods in conjunction with two intensity measures of civil unrest to examine two perspectives on human reactions to disasters (conflictual, cooperative). It also uses insights from the contentious politics literature to understand how emotions posited by the conflictual perspective are transformed into destabilizing acts. While the data show that mean levels of unrest are higher in the wake of disasters, the means poorly reflect the data: the vast majority of episodes do not show higher levels of unrest. Moreover, even when higher levels of unrest emerge, they are not a simple reflection of disaster's human impact; this underscores the importance of the transformational process. Thus, a preliminary model of political violence is investigated; it employs impact, process and institutional variables and it explains three-quarters of the variance in the intensity of violence.
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| 2 |
ID:
137064
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| Summary/Abstract |
Donors often condition foreign aid to recipients on policy adjustments. How do domestic interest groups influence a donor’s ability to credibly commit to implementing threats and promises? In our model, domestic interest groups in the donor country can mobilize to support the donor’s implementation of punishments and rewards. The expectation of such mobilization influences the credibility of threats and promises at the prior contracting stage. The analysis produces three central findings. First, the donor chooses to rely on a single instrument when the domestic interest group exhibits a strong preference for that instrument, even if the cost of using that instrument is relatively high. Second, for credibility reasons the donor often promises generous rewards or threatens ruthless sanctions that seem out of proportion. Finally, the donor cannot simultaneously make credible threats and promises unless domestic interest groups mobilize to support both instruments. We examine the case of US foreign aid to Israel and Palestine to illustrate these theoretical propositions.
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| 3 |
ID:
137061
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| Summary/Abstract |
Since 1990, governments around the developing world have broken contracts made with multinational corporations (MNCs), but the incidence of breach varies across countries and over time. I argue that shared firm nationality is a key determinant of contract sanctity. MNCs are likely to divert investments or exit in response to breach with a firm of the same nationality but unlikely to react in ways costly to the host government otherwise. At the level of the economy as a whole, host governments gain permissive space to trade-off among national groups of investors when a greater diversity of foreign direct investment nationalities is present. I use national-, firm-, and dyadic-level data from 1990 to 2008 to demonstrate nationality-tied firm responses to breach. Counterintuitively, deeper integration with more nationally diverse MNCs enables more breach, as governments gain space to prioritize other goals over the property and preferences of foreign capital.
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| 4 |
ID:
137062
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| Summary/Abstract |
Since 1990, governments around the developing world have broken contracts made with multinational corporations (MNCs), but the incidence of breach varies across countries and over time. I argue that shared firm nationality is a key determinant of contract sanctity. MNCs are likely to divert investments or exit in response to breach with a firm of the same nationality but unlikely to react in ways costly to the host government otherwise. At the level of the economy as a whole, host governments gain permissive space to trade-off among national groups of investors when a greater diversity of foreign direct investment nationalities is present. I use national-, firm-, and dyadic-level data from 1990 to 2008 to demonstrate nationality-tied firm responses to breach. Counterintuitively, deeper integration with more nationally diverse MNCs enables more breach, as governments gain space to prioritize other goals over the property and preferences of foreign capital.
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| 5 |
ID:
137059
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| Summary/Abstract |
Is there a relationship between leadership change and the probability of conflict termination in civil war? This article uses an original data set on the leaders of rebel groups combined with existing data on state leaders to determine whether leadership change in states or rebel groups affects the probability that a civil war will end. Three results emerge: (1) when the leader of a rebel group is captured or killed, wars are 398 percent more likely to end, (2) conflicts are less likely to end while rebel groups are being led by their founder, and (3) the leader of a state that presided over the beginning of the conflict is significantly more likely to bring the conflict to an end than a replacement leader. The results are robust to the use of matching techniques and other tests of endogeneity.
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| 6 |
ID:
137060
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| Summary/Abstract |
Are democracies better at winning wars and militarized disputes? Is there an advantage associated with initiating a war or dispute? Noting that pairwise contest data are the norm in applied research, we motivate a straightforward Bradley–Terry statistical model for these problems from first principles, which will allow for a closer integration of theoretical and statistical practice for scholars of international relations. The essence of this approach is that we learn about the latent abilities of states from observing conflict outcomes between them. We demonstrate the novelty and appeal of this setup with reference to previous attempts to capture estimands of interest and show that for many questions of concern—especially regarding “democratic effectiveness” and “initiation effects”—our approach may be preferred on theoretical and statistical grounds. The evidence we find only partially supports the ideas of “democratic triumphalists”: democracy aids effectiveness, but only in certain contexts (while in others it actually impairs fighting ability). We also provide estimates of possible “initiation effects,” and show that moving first seems to carry little advantage in interstate wars, but a substantial one in lower-level disputes.
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