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ID:
138436
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| Summary/Abstract |
The assumption underlying much of the debate about nuclear proliferation is that future proliferation threats emanate primarily from states outside the democratic community. In this winning essay of the Trench Gascoigne competition 2014, Ben Challis argues that this assumption is mistaken. Instead, he points to a number of common characteristics among authoritarian states that hinder their ability to pursue nuclear weapons, providing more flexibility and time in which the international community can respond. In contrast, many democratic states have the capacity to build nuclear weapons quickly and face growing incentives to do so – suggesting a reassessment of counter-proliferation efforts is required.
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| 2 |
ID:
177993
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| Summary/Abstract |
What should a powerful patron do when a weaker protégé plans to launch a counter-proliferation strike against the nuclear facilities of a target country? This paper identifies three possible strategies available to the patron when handling a ‘trigger happy’ protégé. These strategies range from lending ‘tacit support’ to the protégé’ on the one end, to ‘intervention by exposure’, on the other end, where the raid is effectively sabotaged. Occupying the middle ground is a strategy termed ‘status quo adherence’, in which the patron attempts to warn the protégé against launching the raid, while simultaneously bidding to mitigate the protégé’s concerns by other diplomatic measures. By accessing previously untapped documents from several archives, the study uses the Carter administration’s approach to Israel’s growing agitation with the Iraqi nuclear programme to explore the strategy of ‘status quo adherence’ and its lessons.
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