| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
193083
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
This study explores the nexus between crime and Islamic State (ISIS) terrorism in America. It highlights trends in the criminal history of all federal ISIS defendants and deceased perpetrators in America, and evaluates whether crime was integral to a plot’s funding or logistics. While less pronounced than in Europe, a prevalence of prior violent crimes is evident, although plot-relevant crime was generally perpetrated by those without criminal history. It explores how gangs and prison impact defendant radicalization and mobilization, finding that gang members often left gang life upon radicalization, and while rare, prison inmates were radicalized by non-isolated terrorist inmates.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 2 |
ID:
164290
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
What organisational attributes enhance a military’s ability to effectively adapt on the battlefield? Upon the outbreak of war in July 2014 between Israel and the Palestinian militant group Hamas, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) encountered an expansive network of tunnels from which Hamas was launching large-scale assaults into Israel. This article illustrates that the IDF’s ability to successfully adapt ‘under fire’ to this battlefield surprise was facilitated by several important attributes related to its organisational learning capacity: a dynamic, action-oriented organisational culture, a flexible leadership and command style, specialised commando units which acted as ‘incubators’ for learning and innovation, and a formal system to institutionalise and disseminate lessons learned.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 3 |
ID:
138744
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
This article highlights a pattern of military adaptation and tactical problem-solving utilized by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) while engaged in protracted conflict with the Lebanese militant group Hizballah. It discusses the IDF’s recent attempts to institutionalize their historically intuitive process of ad-hoc learning by developing a formal tactical-level mechanism for ‘knowledge management’. The diffusion of this battlefield lesson-learning system that originated at lower-levels of the organization is examined, as well as its implementation and effectiveness during the 2006 Lebanon War. A nuanced analysis of IDF adaptation illustrates the dynamic interplay between both ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ processes of military innovation.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|