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| 1 |
ID:
137058
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| Summary/Abstract |
In this previously unpublished interview, James R. Clapper, Jr., the current Director of National Intelligence (DNI) in the United States, discusses his experiences as spymaster leading an Intelligence Community widely viewed as organizationally decentralized and criticized in the past for failing to work together harmoniously. Director Clapper argues that the Community has become much more structurally integrated, and that the Office of the DNI (ODNI) provides an opportunity for leadership that is more effective than outside critics have acknowledged. I conducted this interview in August 2014 at his office near Tyson's Corner in North Arlington, Virginia. It was a time of rising unrest in the world, with elite Russian troops carrying out forays across the border into Ukraine, a Middle East terrorist faction known as ISIS gathering momentum in a march from Syria toward Baghdad, and with recurring violence that continued to plague the relationship between the Hamas faction in Palestine and the state of Israel
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| 2 |
ID:
137054
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In a series of reports and meetings in Spring 2011, intelligence analysts and officials debated the chances that Osama bin Laden was living in Abbottabad, Pakistan. Estimates ranged from a low of 30 or 40 per cent to a high of 95 per cent. President Obama stated that he found this discussion confusing, even misleading. Motivated by that experience, and by broader debates about intelligence analysis, this article examines the conceptual foundations of expressing and interpreting estimative probability. It explains why a range of probabilities can always be condensed into a single point estimate that is clearer (but logically no different) than standard intelligence reporting, and why assessments of confidence are most useful when they indicate the extent to which estimative probabilities might shift in response to newly gathered information.
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| 3 |
ID:
137053
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| Summary/Abstract |
Despite the fact that the issue of whether Canada should develop a greater foreign intelligence capability has been broached numerous times, in various guises, over more than a century, those who have followed the development of the country's intelligence architecture will know it has never had a foreign intelligence service like its close allies. They will also be aware that on each occasion on which the issue has been raised, the Canadian government has declined to proceed. If history is any guide, there is a strong likelihood that the idea of Canada developing a more robust capability will again engage politicians, former intelligence officials, academics, the media, and think tanks in the not too distant future. The view adopted in this paper is that the public discourse has become sterile, and that if it is to advance, aspects of the counterfactual case – why has a foreign Humint capability not been developed? – may prove more fruitful.
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| 4 |
ID:
137052
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| Summary/Abstract |
The need for Communications Intelligence in the Netherlands was first felt by the Dutch military as a consequence of the outbreak of the First World War. The decision to prolong, as in the Netherlands, or establish, as in the case of the East Indies, COMINT facilities belonged to the judicial domain and was primarily related to threats posed by revolutionary movements from within the country. The monitoring of traffic from foreign embassies or consulates happened only when interference from foreign governments was suspected. Japanese expansionism, leading to direct Japanese involvement in the political developments in the East Indies, provided such a case. As a consequence, the fine line between domestic and foreign affairs became thinner still until it entirely vanished during the later part of the 1930s.
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| 5 |
ID:
137057
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| Summary/Abstract |
Strategic culture has traditionally been used to detach non-western strategic behaviour from western ideas of rationality, but the concept is commonly used as a practical way of discussing apparent quirks of policy.1 The intelligence field nowadays recognizes the novelty of engaging wholeheartedly with strategic culture. Intelligence agencies have been ill-equipped to question their own assumptions, which trigger failed prediction of military capabilities and political intentions.2
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| 6 |
ID:
137055
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| Summary/Abstract |
This paper draws on liberal communitarianism to analyze two National Security Agency programs: the bulk phone records collection program and PRISM. Specifically, the paper addresses the following questions: Does the threat to national security justify such programs? Can this threat be addressed through standard criminal procedures favored by civil libertarians? Are the programs effective? To what extent do they violate the privacy of American citizens? What are the rights of non-Americans with respect to the programs? Are the programs in line with the Constitution and the various laws that govern them? Is there sufficient accountability and oversight of these programs?
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| 7 |
ID:
137056
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| Summary/Abstract |
In a prolonged multidimensional conflict such as the Cold War, military threats were aggravated by the challenges of internal subversion and propaganda. These posed huge problems to the smaller NATO members, who lacked the resources to respond to Soviet bloc/communist tactics. This article focuses on two Greek proposals to NATO, in 1952 and 1958, which intended to address such issues. In the first instance, Athens contributed to the creation of the NATO Special Committee. In 1958, a Greek proposal on psychological warfare was brushed aside. The article tries to interpret Greek motives, the alliance's response and the reasons which led to the rejection of the latter proposal.
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