|
|
|
Sort Order |
|
|
|
Items / Page
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
137782
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Despite extensive economic ties and political engagement throughout Asia and sizable investment in some of the region's most vulnerable regimes, China has yet to develop a stable of devoted client states. This article argues that both strategic and normative factors militate against China's cultivation of strong patron–client pacts. The article then uses the case of Cambodia to illustrate these arguments, analyzing how that partnership has developed and its important limitations.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 2 |
ID:
137783
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
There is always a time gap between the decision for war and its implementation. I exploit this time gap to study how the signaling of resolve changes after the decision for war is made, based on the wars that China fought since 1949. I study the series of signals that China sent after it had made its decisions for war in Korea (1950), India (1962) and Vietnam (1979), and compare them with the signals sent just before the decisions were made. I find patterns in Chinese prewar signaling that reflect how strategic incentives for the signaling of resolve change before and after the decision for war. The study generates theoretical expectations on discontinuities in signaling behavior upon the decision for war – an unexplored research area with direct policy implications.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 3 |
ID:
137785
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The Korean government's engagement in FTAs since the late 1990s has been enthusiastic. As of 2012, the Korean government concluded FTAs with small trading partners such as Chile, Singapore, EFTA, ASEAN, India, Peru, and Turkey, and major counterparts such as the European Union (EU) and the United States as well. However, the degree of each of the Korean administrations' engagement in FTAs has shown discernible differences: While the Kim Dae-jung administration passively engaged in FTAs, the Roh Moo-hyun administration was proactive in that engagement. What explains the shift from the Kim administration's passive FTA policy to the Roh administration's comprehensive multi-track FTA policy? This article argues that the appreciation of the Korean won since 2001 made Korean exporters lose their price competitiveness in the global market, thereby forcing the Roh administration to offset Korean exporters' lost price competitiveness by formulating a comprehensive multi-track FTA policy, with huge side payments for politically sensitive import-competing sectors.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 4 |
ID:
137780
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
This paper seeks to enrich understandings of middle-power security strategies by examining countries that lack great-power capabilities but still aim to influence the regional security environment. Based on a literature review highlighting the functional and behavioral approaches of middle power diplomacy, we note that these elements could also apply to their regional security strategies. The paper focuses on regional security strategy as a subset of foreign policy and asks why some middle powers appear to go for a regional security strategy that is more functional while others adopt a strategy that is more behavioral. It argues that this divergence derives primarily from differences in resource availability and strategic environment. An analysis of Indonesia, South Korea, Australia and Vietnam highlights how each of these middle powers has adopted a particular regional security strategy, driven by their resource availability and strategic environment.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 5 |
ID:
137781
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Conventional wisdom is that trade policy is often guided by geopolitical security considerations. A growing body of research addresses the security–trade linkage as a plausible cause for executive negotiations over the Korea–US Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) in 2007. Yet, the approval of a trade deal with the Asian ally by America's legislature in 2011 features not only ‘security ties’ but also ‘electoral connections’. This paper seeks to examine the question of whether alliance relationships would inevitably translate into domestic commitments. Bringing domestic politics into consideration, this article also fills the gap in the literature on Congress-focused research of the KORUS FTA and sheds light on how lawmakers strike a balance between the principle of US foreign policy and the reality of conflicting domestic interests.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 6 |
ID:
137784
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Why does Ma Ying-jeou pursue a China-tilting policy when US–PRC relations become more competitive after 2010? Indeed, the president's mainland policy has gone far beyond the strategic requirements to satisfy international pressures for a stable cross-strait relationship. According to neoclassical realism, domestic politics acts as ‘intervening variables’ through which systemic imperatives are translated into a state's foreign policy response. Based, in part, on this author's interviews in Taiwan, this paper contends that due to Taiwan's internal political divisions on the ‘one China’ issue, elected leaders strive for their own nation-building projects, which, in turn, generate policies that undermine Taiwan's national security. Since 2008, the KMT tries to reshape Taiwan's identity through the rehabilitation of the ROC as the legitimate ‘one China’. Though Ma's rapprochement with Beijing on the basis of the ‘1992 consensus’ has contributed to cross-strait stability, his embrace of a China-centric national identity has also placed the administration increasingly at odds with Taiwan's public which gave the KMT a resounding electoral defeat in Taiwan's local elections of November 2014. As Taipei becomes more aligned to the PRC, its security ties with America and Japan could be compromised.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|