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| 1 |
ID:
054798
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| 2 |
ID:
051875
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| 3 |
ID:
076533
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| 4 |
ID:
087650
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The dominant narrative concerning the Bush Doctrine maintains that it is a dangerous innovation, an anomaly that violates the principles of sound policy as articulated by the Founders. According to the conventional wisdom, the Bush Doctrine represents the exploitation of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, by a small group of ideologues-the "neoconservatives"-to gain control of national policy and lead the United States into the war in Iraq, a war that should never have been fought. But far from a being a neoconservative innovation, the Bush Doctrine is, in fact, well within the mainstream of U.S. foreign policy and very much in keeping with the vision of America's founding generation and the practice of the statesmen in the Early Republic. The Bush Doctrine is only the latest manifestation of the fact that U.S. national interest has always been concerned with more than simple security.
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| 5 |
ID:
082837
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| Publication |
2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The aim of this article is to contribute to our understanding of both the debate over the war in Iraq and its implications for the future of U.S. foreign policy by examining the relationship between neoconservatism and realism. The article begins by establishing the connection between the tenets of neoconservatism and the arguments for war against Iraq. The primary focus is on the neoconservative Bush Doctrine that served as the primary justification for the Iraq War. Next, we turn to the arguments that realists put forth in their attempt to steer America away from the road to war. The realists, however, proved to be unsuccessful in their attempt to prevent war and in the final section we address the central question of the article; why did realism fail in the debate over Iraq?
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| 6 |
ID:
057495
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| 7 |
ID:
055527
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| 8 |
ID:
023208
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| Publication |
Dec 2002.
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| Description |
4-6
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| 9 |
ID:
054476
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| 10 |
ID:
053415
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| Publication |
Sep-Oct 2004.
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| 11 |
ID:
056743
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| 12 |
ID:
059546
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| Publication |
Winter 2004-05.
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| 13 |
ID:
086411
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
A conventional technocratic wisdom has begun to form that blames the failure of the US led invasion of Iraq on the small number of American troops deployed and the ideological divisions at the centre of the Bush administration itself. This paper argues that both these accounts are at best simply descriptive. A much more sustained explanation has to be based on a close examination of the ideological assumptions that shaped the drafting of policies and planning for the aftermath of the war. The point of departure for such an analysis is that all agency, whether individual or collective, is socially mediated. The paper deploys Antonio Gramsci's notion of 'Common Sense' to examine the Bush administration's policy towards Iraq. It argues that the Common Sense at work in the White House, Defence Department and Green Zone was primarily responsible for America's failure. It examines the relationship between the 'higher philosophies' of both Neoconservatism and Neo-Liberalism and Common Sense. It concludes that although Neoconservatism was influential in justifying the invasion itself, it was Neo-Liberalism that shaped the policy agenda for the aftermath of war. It takes as its example the pre-war planning for Iraq, then the disbanding of the Iraqi army and the de-Ba'athification of the Iraqi state. The planning and these two decisions, responsible for driving Iraq into civil war, can only be fully explained by studying the ideology that shaped them. From this perspective, the United States intervention in Iraq was not the product of an outlandish ideology but was instead the high water mark of post-Cold War Liberal interventionism. As such, it highlights the ideological and empirical shortcomings associated with 'Kinetic Liberalism'.
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| 14 |
ID:
055792
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| 15 |
ID:
060373
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| Publication |
Mar-Apr 2005.
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| 16 |
ID:
068848
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| 17 |
ID:
057765
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| 18 |
ID:
071835
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| Publication |
2006.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Bush administration's "revolutionary" foreign policy rhetoric has not changed, but its actual policies have: after squandering U.S. legitimacy, breaking the domestic bank, and getting the United States bogged down in an unsuccessful war, the Bush doctrine has run up against reality and become unsustainable. The counterrevolution should be welcomed -- and, if possible, locked in.
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| 19 |
ID:
023099
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| Publication |
Issue 2003.
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| Description |
8-36
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| 20 |
ID:
065457
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