| Summary/Abstract |
China has been experiencing major transformation in its naval strategy and capacity. Starting off in the late 1980s with rapid naval modernisation, China’s naval operation gradually shifts from the overwhelming ‘near seas’ to the more challenging ‘far seas’. This task is not an easy one. Whilst in the ‘near seas’ China has been enjoying relatively naval superiority, naval operations in the ‘far seas’ is more demanding. Assessing China’s naval capability in three areas of naval forces, naval activities and presence, and overseas naval bases throws a light on the discrepancy between actual capability and intention. Three reasons lend explanation for the hurdles China faces in implementing the ‘far-seas operations’. First, China is preoccupied with the geopolitical struggle in the ‘near seas’, namely, Taiwan, Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute in East China Sea, and the South China Sea dispute. Second, China is confronted with the ‘Malacca dilemma’ that shoves it to rethink its naval ambition. Third, the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) already has two major players, the United States and India, with which China has to struggle to pursue its interests. The three reasons combined with lack of naval capability to accommodate an effective ‘far-seas operations’ are accountable for China’s confined strategy in the IOR.
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