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| 1 |
ID:
122494
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Attack Helicopter has value for money in a relatively benign environment for short, swift Special Operations where the opposition has restricted ability to interdict the AH. Other countries have huge air arms for each Service, some of which are now closing down. There is no justification for India to mimic defunct, untried and indeed failed strategies developed for European and Middle East scenarios. This approach may mislead us into a weapons procurement minefield. Thereafter, wasteful expenditure will hamper us from getting what we really need for India's safety and security.
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| 2 |
ID:
170896
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| Summary/Abstract |
Why did India launch and later withdraw from the exercise in coercive diplomacy – Operation Parakram – against Pakistan in response to the attack on India’s Parliament by terrorists based in that country? This paper marshals factors operating at the systemic, state and individual/small-group levels of analysis to show that, despite the paucity of evidence on decisionmaking of the kind required for an effective foreign policy analysis (FPA) approach, a reasonably clear picture can be developed. It combines deductive logic relating to state behavior in a nuclearized environment with the limited empirical evidence available to show that India never intended to go to war and that the operation was essentially a bluff that, having eventually reached a dead end, was called off.
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| 3 |
ID:
089688
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
It has been ten years since valiant Indian soldiers achieved the impossible feat of evicting Pakistani intruders from the dizzy heights of kargil. Frontally assaulting peaks over 15000 feet in waves the Indian Infantry defied all established norms of mountain warfare, a feat unthinkable for any modern army in the world today.
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| 4 |
ID:
097318
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
How effective was the Indian government in sending clear, coercive signals and orchestrating them into coherent messages during 'Operation Parakram' in 2001-02? This study finds that compellence was hampered by three factors: (1) the government kept changing its demands; (2) the lack of adequate civil-military coordination; and (3) the government engaged in a dual-track policy of direct coercion of Pakistan, while simultaneously engaging the United States to put pressure on Pakistan. Ultimately, these two policy strands worked at cross-purposes to each other.
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| 5 |
ID:
122139
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