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| 1 |
ID:
139036
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| Summary/Abstract |
Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has pursued a two-pronged strategy towards China. On the one hand, Washington has sought to engage Beijing across a wide range of domains, including through bilateral diplomacy, participation in multilateral institutions, trade, investment, scientific cooperation, educational and cultural exchange, civil-society initiatives and military-to-military dialogues. While activity in most of these areas extends back to the initial Nixon–Kissinger ‘opening’ to China in the late 1960s, since the early 1990s there has been a substantial broadening and deepening in each.
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| 2 |
ID:
167324
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| Summary/Abstract |
Facing powerful challenges from both China and the US, the long-standing engagement policy is on the defensive. Focusing on advancing American economic and security interests rather than its ideals and prioritizing reciprocity above economic cooperation, the Trump administration has declared China a strategic competitor and escalated a trade war into a multi-front conflict. However, profound interdependence continues underpinning the bilateral relationship. Neither the US nor China can afford to disengage from the other. The two countries are not natural partners but not inevitable enemies either. Competition does not mean confrontation, much less war. Engagement remains the foundation for healthy competition.
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| 3 |
ID:
186166
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article argues that although the US–China rivalry has not presented with some essential elements of the US–Soviet Cold War, the emerging bipolarity has led to misplaced ideological hostility and repeated failling attempts of building alliance systems. Delicate power balance between the two countries has further complicated the rivalry by giving each side the false conviction to prevail.
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