|
|
|
Sort Order |
|
|
|
Items / Page
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
113824
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2012.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Powerful states often accept unanimity voting on accession to international institutions, even though this enables weak states to blackmail powerful states into providing costly side payments. Whereas the literature attributes this choice mainly to efforts to bolster the legitimacy of international institutions, the authors demonstrate that the choice of unanimity also has a strategic component. The authors formally show that unanimous accession rules can profit powerful states by creating uncertainty as to the minimal level of reform that enables accession. If accession is valuable enough and the membership candidate is uncertain about the resolve of weak states, it plays safe by implementing ambitious reforms that improve the efficacy of the international institution. In this case, a legitimacy-efficacy trade-off does not exist: the unanimity rule enhances legitimacy while allowing powerful states to induce significant reforms by applicants to the benefit of current members.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 2 |
ID:
167369
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Among both elites and the mass public, conservatives and liberal differ in their foreign policy preferences. Relatively little effort, however, has been put toward showing that, beyond the use of force, these differences affect the day-to-day outputs and processes of foreign policy. This article uses United Nations voting data from 1946 to 2008 of the five major Anglophone democracies of the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand to show that each of these countries votes more in line with the rest of the world when liberals are in power. This can be explained by ideological differences between conservatives and liberals and the ways in which the socializing power of international institutions interact with preexisting ideologies. The results hope to encourage more research into the ways in which ideological differences among the masses and elites translate into differences in foreign policy goals and practices across governments.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 3 |
ID:
145400
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Although some analysts have emphasized the importance of China's becoming a “responsible stakeholder” in the international order, the United States has in effect blocked China's full participation in a range of existing international institutions and attempted to undermine China's efforts to create and lead new international institutions. In this article I examine those US efforts, particularly with regard to the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, where the United States attempted to block other states from becoming members. I explore the difference between multifaceted and aggression-limiting containment and propose that the United States apply the latter to help stabilize Sino-US relations.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 4 |
ID:
073684
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2006.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
International state-building has become central to international policy concerns and has marked a clear neo-Wilsonian shift in international thinking, spurred by the leadership of the United States and the European Union. Today's approaches insist on the regulatory role of international institutions and downplay the importance of locally-derived political solutions. This privileging of 'governance' over 'government' is based on the assumption that the political process can be externally influenced through the promotion of institutional changes introduced at the state level and pays less attention to how societal pressures and demands are constitutive of stable and legitimate institutional mechanisms. This article questions this approach and analyses the transformation in the assessment of the importance of the societal sphere. It considers how this shift has been shaped by current understandings of war and conflict, and how the prioritisation of governance has fitted with critical and post-positivist trends in academic thinking in international relations and security studies. The discussion is illustrated with examples drawn largely from the Balkans and the international regime in Bosnia-Herzegovina in particular.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 5 |
ID:
103889
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2011.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Rationalist accounts of international cooperation maintain that states create international institutions to solve problems of distrust. They rest on a particular notion of trust, a strategic variety in which states trust based on information about others' interests. I seek to overturn this conventional wisdom. Drawing on social psychology, I point to the importance of generalized trust, an ideological belief about the trustworthiness of others in general. Generalized trust precedes institution-building and serves as a form of anarchical social capital, facilitating diffuse reciprocity and allowing state leaders to commit to multilateralism even in cases that rationalists deem inhospitable to cooperation and without the institutional protections that rationalists expect. In case studies of U.S. policy on the creation of the League of Nations and the United Nations, I demonstrate that generalized trust is necessary for explaining the origins of American multilateralism and the design of these organizations.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 6 |
ID:
152276
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
There is a growing concern that China has become more assertive in its foreign policies. The fear is whether China’s economic growth may translate into modern and effective military advancement. This engenders the critical question of whether China feels comfortable in the current international order, which is defined by international law and institutions. This article argues that the Chinese approach to international law and institutions is tightly associated with its evolving perception of sovereignty, and national interests vis-à-vis international law and institutions, and is characterised by a love–hate attitude towards them. With its opening up, China now views multilateralism as a way for the international community to constrain the capriciousness of a superpower, and regards the international institutions simply as power-sharing development. However, China’s integration in international institutions represents its attempt to work within international norms to pursue its interests. China’s ambivalence towards international judicial settlement of disputes signals the historical legacy as well as China’s uneasiness with playing an active role in international institution-building and rule-making.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 7 |
ID:
153546
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
While China used to condemn UN peacekeeping as a Western tool in the 1970s, it now supplies the largest number of UN peacekeeping troops among the UN Security Council Permanent Five. To explain this puzzling change in China’s attitude toward UN peacekeeping, this paper constructs an original framework that unpacks China’s evolution in self-identity as a “responsible major power” by first disaggregating the economic, military, and political costs and benefits for its participation in UN peacekeeping. In so doing, this paper shows that China’s attitudinal change is best captured by a shift from a present-cost-driven, “purchase” model of participation in international institutions to a future-benefit-driven, “investment” model of participation. A series of key events that occurred between the mid-1990s and the early 2000s, notably China’s accession to the WTO and its successful bid to host the 2008 Olympic Games, had in part accustomed China to paying large institutional costs upfront in order to be “part of the club.” The paper concludes with a brief discussion on the applicability, or the lack thereof, of the Chinese experience to other countries’ experiences with international institutions given China’s unique historical trajectory and cultural idiosyncrasies.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 8 |
ID:
142653
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The threat of terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction remains a daunting concern. Governments have undertaken several initiatives at the national and international level to prevent such illicit use, yet challenges remain. Notable is the absence of a single collaborative international forum of experts dedicated solely to bioterrorism prevention. The establishment of a Bioterrorism Prevention Initiative could be a possible solution to address this gap. This article explores possibilities for such an initiative and the ways in which it could strengthen the existing bio-nonproliferation regime.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 9 |
ID:
127600
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2014.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Over the past decade, amid growing international fragmentation and declining US hegemony, Brazil has assertively expanded its participation in multilateral forums as part of a diplomatic strategy that envisions a reformulation of international institutions. At the same time, Brazil has also worked on building a leadership role within South America. These global and regional aims continue to shape the country's use of soft power. Indeed, soft power-defined by the political scientist Joseph S. Nye Jr. as influencing the behavior of others via attraction or persuasion rather than coercion or payment-is nothing new in Brazil's international dealings. Since the early 1900s, the nation has used such a strategy under different labels in conjunction with two beliefs central to its foreign policy: the need to build and assure Brazil's autonomy in its development strategy and foreign policy choices, and the desire to raise its global political profile
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 10 |
ID:
180284
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
This article analyses the role played by the Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) countries within the context of the reform of international institutions, in primis the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). In recent years, the new emerging powers, among which the BRICS occupy a central position, have instigated a paradigm shift in international relations and global governance (GG). Furthermore, some scholars argue that the BRICS could inaugurate a new world order. Since the United Nations (UN) is one of the institutions in which these changes need to be more broadly reflected due to its global projection, it is doubtful if the BRICS will be able to bring about its reform. In fact, several debates were conducted about the need to reform the UN and, in particular, the Security Council (SC). In order to do this, the article examines the interests of the BRICS countries, within the group itself, and their vision for the UNSC. Only a common vision within the group could have specific effects in reforming the UNSC, thus giving a new shape to GG, which may not be possible. There are several obstacles from within the BRICS itself in this regard, despite the fact that during their summits, they have repeatedly called for the UN reforms.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 11 |
ID:
144252
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
This article analyses the implications and consequences of the rise of BRICS for the developing world and for global governance. In doing so, it examines BRICS’ increasing importance among developing countries and their growing significance in the world economy, situated in historical perspective, and considers the factors underlying the evolution of the group as an economic and political formation. This is followed by an analysis of the possible economic impact of future growth in BRICS on other developing countries, which could be complementary or competitive, positive or negative. In conclusion it discusses the potential influence of BRICS, extending beyond economics to politics, in the wider global context, with reference to international institutions and cooperation among developing countries.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 12 |
ID:
163306
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Nationalism and nativism are roiling politics on every continent. With the election of President Donald Trump in the United States, the growing power of right-wing populist parties in Europe, and the ascent of strongmen in states such as China, the Philippines, and Turkey, liberals around the world are struggling to respond to populist nationalism. Today’s nationalists decry the “globalist” liberalism of international institutions. They attack liberal elites as sellouts who care more about foreigners than their fellow citizens. And they promise to put national, rather than global, interests first
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 13 |
ID:
074647
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2006.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Peace-building is now a major aspect of the work of international institutions. While once the international community aimed simply to maintain a ceasefire and restore some form of stability in conflict zones, since the early 1990s there has been increasing attention given to creating peaceful and democratic societies through international intervention. A common problem in international peace-building projects over the past decade has been the position of women, particularly their limited involvement in the institutional design of peace-building strategies and the possibility that peace-building may actually reduce local women's agency in society. This article discusses the modern enterprise of peace-building and identifies international legal principles that can serve as a framework for peace-building projects in which women's lives are taken seriously.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 14 |
ID:
193107
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
There is limited evidence that reliance on foreign aid from Western donors compels repressive governments to embrace democratic reforms and respect citizens’ rights. However, donors have another, potentially more powerful source of financial leverage: debt relief. This paper exploits two features of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) debt relief initiative, launched by the International Monetary Fund and World Bank in 1996, to probe whether Western leverage has constrained repression across Africa. First, the Bretton Woods institutions initiated debt relief negotiations with virtually all African governments. Second, many recipients were in power long before HIPC negotiations began and remained after they concluded. Using a differences-in-differences estimator, I show that the daily rate of repression fell by between 10% and 30% during debt relief negotiations. This effect holds across autocracies and democracies, and during periods of sustained protests. When debt crises were more severe, debt relief negotiations were even more constraining.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 15 |
ID:
187384
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
This essay proposes a periodization of Canada’s cross-Pacific relations: from the Asia-Pacific era beginning in the 1980s to the Indo-Pacific era beginning around 2018. In the era of the Asia-Pacific, Canada was relatively disengaged on matters other than economic relations, as Ottawa sought to capitalize on dynamic emerging markets. Canada’s non-confrontational approach enabled a constructive relationship with China. The conditions for this functional relationship changed as Xi Jinping’s China assumed a more overtly revisionist, risk-taking, and confrontational foreign policy. In light of this, like-minded players in Asian security have adopted the “Indo-Pacific” nomenclature and concept in order to facilitate more interaction with each other and maintain maritime security. Midway through the Trudeau government’s tenure, the “Indo-Pacific” is likewise being adopted, as relations between China have soured while relations with other Asian partners are increasingly prioritized, notably in the security domain.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 16 |
ID:
161995
|
|
|
| 17 |
ID:
091933
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2009.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
China's new thinking about neighboring diplomacy in Asia since the end of Cold war can be analyzed theoretically from angle of international institutions.China utilizes institutionalism with great flexibility in four sub-regions-Central Asia, Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia and South Asia, where institutional models-dominant participation, deep participation, active participation and moderate participation models have been adopted.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 18 |
ID:
172122
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Abstract
With China’s reintegration into the international system its involvement in multilateral initiatives, interactions with international institutions, and participation in global governance have become integral parts of Chinese foreign policy. Chinese scholars have conducted a great deal of research on these topics. The first stage of Chinese scholars’ research centered on China’s multilateral diplomacy and the interaction between China and international institutions, while the second stage focused on China’s participation in global governance. Although some scholars have made substantial achievements, in general, most of the research only interprets the ideas and policies related to global governance proposed by the Chinese government, and has not explained China’s strategies and actions in global governance. Furthermore, Chinese scholars provide little analysis on the dynamics of China’s participation in different issue areas. Many scholars have articulated a series of policy recommendations, but no specific measures have been suggested.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 19 |
ID:
165882
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Reciprocity is one of the oldest principles of warfare, but humanitarian norms embedded in international humanitarian law (IHL) prohibit reciprocity over various wartime acts. When it comes to the treatment of prisoners of war (POWs), how do these conflicting norms shape public opinion? One perspective is that citizens who learn about IHL acquire an unconditional aversion to abusing POWs. Alternatively, people may understand IHL as a conditional commitment that instead strengthens their approval for reciprocal conduct. Survey experiments fielded in the United States support the latter view: people’s preferences depend on the enemy’s behavior, and this “reciprocity effect” is largest among those who believe that the United States is legally committed to treating POWs humanely. Puzzlingly, prior studies do not find a reciprocity effect, but this is due to their use of a no-information experimental control group, which led to a lack of control over the subjects’ assumptions about the survey
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 20 |
ID:
191904
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
International organizations come in many shapes and sizes. Within this institutional gamut, the multipurpose multilateral intergovernmental organization (MMIGO) plays a central role. This institutional form is often traced to the creation of the League of Nations, but in fact the first MMIGO emerged in the Western Hemisphere at the close of the nineteenth century. Originally modeled on a single-issue European public international union, the Commercial Bureau of the American Republics evolved into the multipurpose, multilateral Pan American Union (PAU). Contrary to prominent explanations of institutional genesis, the PAU's design did not result from functional needs nor from the blueprints of a hegemonic power. Advancing a recent synthesis between historical and rational institutionalism, we argue that the first MMIGO arose through a process of compensatory layering: a mechanism whereby a sequence of bargains over control and scope leads to gradual but transformative institutional change. We expect compensatory layering to occur when an organization is focal, power asymmetries among members of that organization are large, and preferences over institutional design diverge. Our empirical and theoretical contributions demonstrate the value a more global international relations (IR) perspective can bring to the study of institutional design. international relations (IR) scholars have long noted that international organizations provide smaller states with voice opportunities; our account suggests those spaces may be of smaller states’ own making.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|