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ID:
139161
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Iranian hostage crisis remains as one of the dominant memories from the presidency of Jimmy Carter. While scholars and journalists have devoted considerable attention to the administration's response to the crisis, no one has focused on the religious dimension of the hostage crisis. Drawing extensively on the archival records of the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, this study argues that American and Iranian perceptions of the other's religion complicated a conflict already fraught with sacred symbolism. While the Iranians castigated Carter for insincerely professing his faith, the president's foreign policy advisors underestimated the role of religion in the new Iranian regime and how it might be used to bring the hostages home. The hostages finally came home when the United States negotiated with Iran's religious leaders and those leaders no longer had any political use for the hostages. Ultimately, this essay contributes to the relatively small literature analyzing the foreign relations of the Carter administration through a religious lens.
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| 2 |
ID:
181286
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| Summary/Abstract |
When the US embassy in Teheran was stormed in 1979, and the embassy personnel taken hostage, the PLO saw an opportunity to engage with the United States. Since the early 1970s the PLO had tried to open a political channel with the USA. While several back-channels had been attempted none resulted in direct political talks between the US and the PLO. The US was bound by a secret agreement with Israel, as part of Sinai II, having promised not to negotiate with the PLO. When the US hostages were taken in 1979, the PLO attempted to use their contacts in the new Iranian regime to negotiate on behalf of the US. While this channel did not result in a major breakthrough in the hostage negotiations, it is a case which illustrates a paradox in US Middle East policy: The US was unwilling to negotiate with the Palestinians when it was their conflict that was at stake, but once US lives were in the balance, the US administration was more than willing to open a direct channel to the PLO. Arafat, for his part, was equally willing to step up, hoping to make political gains further down the line.
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