| Summary/Abstract |
The Indian acquisition canvas in these times is exemplified more by its failings than its accomplishments. Two accidents, one of them fatal, involving utility helicopters in February 2015, have yet again brought to the fore the grim reality of the material readiness in the Indian armed forces, the reluctant clients to a sub-optimal acquisition apparatus. Defence capital acquisition the world over, by its very nature, is a highly rigorous, time consuming and resource intensive domain. In India, acquisition involves multifarious directorates in the Service Headquarters, the Acquisition Wing in the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the Department of Defence Production (DDP) embodying India’s burgeoning Military Industrial Complex (MIC). Regrettably, India’s armed forces, despite being the biggest arms importer in the world, endure hollowness of critical military equipment. Multiple high level committees since independence have recommended a slew of acquisition reforms, with little realisation on the ground.1 India’s defence modernisation has often been described as a parochial Army effort without the benefit of strong political direction
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