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| 1 |
ID:
139185
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article seeks to analyse the lessons of the 1965 Indo-Pak war that are applicable today. It finds that the current army doctrine, Cold Start, has some similarities to the opening round of the 1965 war. It argues that even the attritionist strategy adopted in 1965 may have more to give today than the manoeuvre war approach of its more famous successor, the 1971 war. In particular, the article appraises Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri’s firm political control during the war and finds that it was ably reinforced by the prime ministers who were at the helm in India’s later wars. Knowing when to stop is key to avoiding nuclear thresholds, and in that the 1965 war, which stopped short of decisive victory, serves as a suitable precedent to potential future conflicts.
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| 2 |
ID:
139184
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| Summary/Abstract |
The 1965 Indo-Pak War came when India was in the midst of a major military expansion. India did not want to escalate matters when Pakistani forces invaded Kutch in April 1965 and accepted a ceasefire with British mediation. Although the government allowed the use of Indian Air Force (IAF) combat aircraft on 1 September 1965, action remained localised to the Chhamb area for five days. This was primarily because of India’s desire to avoid all-out war. IAF was used for counter air, air defence, and in support of the ground forces. Poor communications with the Army, lack of joint planning, an almost total absence of early warning and ground controlled interception (GCI) radars meant that its overall performance was sub-optimal. Despite these self-imposed restraints, India succeeded in thwarting Pakistan’s efforts to grab Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) by force, and to that extent the war did become a limited victory for India.
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| 3 |
ID:
139181
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| Summary/Abstract |
In 1965, Pakistan attempted infiltration into Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), with Operation Gibralter, followed by a planned capture of Akhnoor Bridge under Operation Grand Slam. While Operation Gibraltar was bold from the point of view of multi-directional infiltration, it was largely based on the utopian dream of President Ayub Khan and Foreign Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, ignoring the ground realities that J&K’s population would not support it. The Indian reaction was swift and included the epic capture of the strategic Haji Pir Pass at a height of 2,637 metres (m) on the formidable Pir Panjal Range that divided the Srinagar valley from the Jammu region. The pass has been a constant source of problems since Pakistan-trained militants have been sneaking into the Kashmir Valley, Poonch and Rajouri districts. Ironically, the Haji Pir Pass, captured through a heroic and daring action, had to be returned to Pakistan under the Tashkent Agreement.
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| 4 |
ID:
139192
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| Summary/Abstract |
Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) was once again in the news for devastation and intense trauma associated with hundreds of unnatural deaths. This time, the cause was not the commonly known beast of terrorism and / or cross border attacks, rather the damage was caused by nature’s fury in the form of unprecedented floods and inundation. The scale of intensity of extreme weather incidences like the J&K flood repeatedly being out the inadequacies in the country’s disaster response capabilities
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| 5 |
ID:
139178
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| Summary/Abstract |
Territory has always played a pivotal role in inter-state rivalry. John A Vasquez has said that the value of territories increases due to their strategic locations, such as if they provide access to the sea or are a source of water. But territories acquire another important dimension if they are home to ethnic and religious communities that form part of the neighbouring state.1 The state of Kashmir presents one such enduring conflict where the separatist demands in the state of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), coupled with the irredentist claim of Pakistan, have helped in shaping a narrative in India. The popular assumption in India is that ‘Muslim separatism’ got manifested in the form of the country’s partition in 1947 and the prevalent contention is that Muslims had a choice of political identity but they chose one based on religion.2 This has resulted in an unintended linking of the Kashmiris’ demand for greater autonomy or a separate state with the identity of Muslims in the rest of India.
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| 6 |
ID:
139182
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| Summary/Abstract |
The continuum of change in militaries is derived from a number of factors, in which application of history plays an important part. The process of Indian Army’s evolution in the plains of Western India could be charted from the lessons learnt from key episodes of the 1965 War. The Battle of Dograi was one such feat which though restricted to action by a single infantry battalion, 3 Jat, provides unique perspectives of the manner in which continuity and transformation has occurred in the Indian Army as well as how the lessons learnt can be applied effectively to current operational dilemmas, ranging from Cold Start to countering Pakistan’s battlefield nuclear rocket, Nasr.
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| 7 |
ID:
139186
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| Summary/Abstract |
The article is a recall of the 1965 War by an infantry company commander in the war. It attempts to bring out how the war was conducted at the tactical level. Charlie Company, commanded by the author, was involved in several skirmishes, company and battalion level attacks as part of 19 Maratha Light Infantry. The unit was part of 7 Infantry Division and fought on the Punjab front. The article covers the run up to the war and the battles, bringing out the human element and tactical level aspects of conflict, some of which continue to be relevant 50 years on. It is a worm’s eye view of war, with an emphasis on combat leadership.
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| 8 |
ID:
139180
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| Summary/Abstract |
Launched in early-August 1965, Operation Gibraltar was designed to infiltrate several columns of trained and well-armed Mujahids and Razakars, led by Pakistan Army Majors into Jammu and Kashmir. Under the cover of fire provided by the Pakistan Army deployed on the Cease Fire Line (CFL), the columns managed to infiltrate, but failed to create large-scale disturbances and did not receive support from the people. In fact, locals often provided information about the columns to the Indian Army, which led to their being captured or neutralised. By the third week of August, the Indian Army’s counter-infiltration operations had been successfully concluded. Trans-CFL operations were then conducted to capture the Haji Pir Pass and important heights in the Kargil sector. This article revisits Operation Gibralter, the thinking behind it and the tasks set, the execution of the operation, the Indian response and the lessons learnt.
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