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| 1 |
ID:
066239
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| 2 |
ID:
076837
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| Publication |
2007.
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| Summary/Abstract |
By rushing into Iraq instead of finishing off the hunt for Osama bin Laden, Washington has unwittingly helped its enemies: al Qaeda has more bases, more partners, and more followers today than it did on the eve of 9/11. Now the group is working to set up networks in the Middle East and Africa -- and may even try to lure the United States into a war with Iran. Washington must focus on attacking al Qaeda's leaders and ideas and altering the local conditions in which they thrive.
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| 3 |
ID:
083402
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| Publication |
2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
After the September 11 attacks, Osama bin Laden launched a third front beyond Afghanistan and Iraq: his own homeland in Saudi Arabia. Saudi authorities have so far successfully countered al Qaeda's offensive, but the war inside the kingdom is far from over.
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| 4 |
ID:
065235
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| 5 |
ID:
058929
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| 6 |
ID:
067776
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| Publication |
2006.
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| Summary/Abstract |
On 5 February 2003, the then US Secretary of State, Gen Colin Powell had said at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) that, “Iraq today harbors a deadly terrorist network, headed by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, an associate and collaborator of Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda lieutenants.” This was an important part of Powell’s false case for an aggression against Iraq and its then president, Saddam Hussain. The world came to know of Zarqawi then for the first time. On 27 December 2004, Osama Bin Laden, the emir of al-Qaeda, declared Zarqawi as the emir al-Qaeda (The Base) in Iraq. Powell’s seemingly prophetic words bore fruit not when Saddam Hussain was at the helm, but when Iraq was under the occupation of the Anglo-American coalition.....
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| 7 |
ID:
053341
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| 8 |
ID:
060186
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| 9 |
ID:
068939
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| 10 |
ID:
053131
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| 11 |
ID:
060709
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| 12 |
ID:
066233
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| 13 |
ID:
059886
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| 14 |
ID:
020740
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| Publication |
2001.
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| Description |
429-434
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| 15 |
ID:
062089
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| 16 |
ID:
060659
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| Publication |
Mar-Apr 2005.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The terrorist attacks that took place on 16 May 2003 in Casablanca were a result of internal factors. These factors include the terrorists" view of their faith, poverty, and under-education. The links between the terrorists in Morocco and the Al Qaeda network, despite their ideological similarities, are not of a “command and control” nature. The relationship can be described as a franchise operation. The attacks resulted in the alienation of the population from movements attempting to use Islam in politics. Consequently, the attacks backfired on the Moroccan Islamist movement.
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| 17 |
ID:
076818
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| 18 |
ID:
068533
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| 19 |
ID:
080904
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| Publication |
2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article investigates the rationales of different explanatory models that have been utilized to explain the ideology of Al Qaeda. From perceptions of madmen and religious hypocrites to Wahhabis of the twenty-first century and Salafi-Jihadists, what these approaches have in common is an "outside-in" perspective that assumes a concept of the underlying logic of Al Qaeda without sufficient reference to primary sources. It is argued that particularly those explanations that seem to have become the official wisdom regarding the fundamental logic of Al Qaeda, Wahhabism and the Salafi-Jihadist discourse, are concepts that are poorly understood and subject to much controversy. In the anxious quest to explain Al Qaeda, the terrorism studies community seems to have deviated from the guidelines of academic conduct and restricted itself to re-assuming for its own use oversimplifications of the complexity of Islamic thought, thereby granting those oversimplifications a new lease on life. The risk of such conduct is that one ends up with a misrepresentation of the very issue he or she seeks to comprehend
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| 20 |
ID:
066961
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