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| 1 |
ID:
154356
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| Summary/Abstract |
Armed non-state actors make mistakes. Why this phenomenon occurs, and how organizations respond to their blunders, has remained understudied. This article draws on interdisciplinary research to examine sources of errors, and offers a public sensitivity argument to explain why groups claim and even apologize for their blunders. The quantitative analysis finds that all armed groups, regardless of ideology and organizational structure, are willing to apologize when there are unintended high casualty rates. A detailed analysis of three Provisional Irish Republican Army incidents reveals that public opinion is sensitive to the nature of the victims, and shows how public condemnation can impact organizational behavior.
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| 2 |
ID:
156897
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| Summary/Abstract |
Unionist politicians have argued that Republican political violence on the Irish border, during both the partition of Ireland and more recent Northern Ireland conflict, constituted ethnic cleansing and genocide against the Protestant/Unionist community in those areas. These views have been bolstered by an increasingly ambivalent scholarly literature that has failed to adequately question the accuracy of these claims. This article interrogates the ethnic cleansing/genocide narrative by analysing Republican violence during the 1920s and the 1970s. Drawing from a wide range of theoretical literature and archival sources, it demonstrates that Republican violence fell far short of either ethnic cleansing or genocide, (in part) as a result of the perpetrators’ self-imposed ideological constraints. It also defines a new interpretive concept for the study of violence: functional sectarianism. This concept is designed to move scholarly discussion of political and sectarian violence beyond the highly politicised and moral cul-de-sacs that have heretofore characterised the debate, and has implications for our understanding of political violence beyond Ireland.
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| 3 |
ID:
057510
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| 4 |
ID:
154972
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| Summary/Abstract |
While the impact of the Troubles retains centrality within much of Northern Irish political life, the spectre of almost daily violence is becoming a more distant memory. Peace has come to the region. In spite of this, however, there are those who wish to maintain the utility of violence to achieve their stated aims. Most dominant among these are the violent dissident republican groups. No longer is their existence solely defined by their desire to bring about a united Ireland. In order to have any opportunity of longevity, they must first legitimize their continued existence, and in turn distance themselves from their former Provisional comrades. This article assesses how groups, such as the Continuity Irish Republican Army (IRA), Óglaigh na hÉireann, and the IRA/New IRA utilize the lessons learned from their Provisional history to differentiate themselves from the politicized dominance of Sinn Féin. This evaluation is carried out through the analysis of interviews with leadership and rank and file members of both political and paramilitary dissident groupings, which is complemented by the analysis of the Violent Dissident Republican events database. These sources are supplemented with the assessment of organizational statements, from 2007 to the present day. The article focuses on violent, and nonviolent, learning.
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| 5 |
ID:
115467
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| 6 |
ID:
146210
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| Summary/Abstract |
The 1919-1921 Anglo-Irish War represents one of the earliest instances of a successful insurgent movement in the twentieth century. By combining a fluid organizational structure with effective hit-and-run tactics and accurate intelligence, the Irish Republican Army was able to defeat militarily the security forces of Great Britain. Combined with a successful propaganda campaign, these tactics allowed the IRA to drive the British to the negotiating table, where its representatives secured greater autonomy than Ireland had known in centuries. The outcome of the Anglo-Irish War demonstrates the success which a well-organized guerrilla campaign can achieve, and the tactics used by the IRA must therefore be understood by any serious student of small warfare.
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| 7 |
ID:
175736
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article builds a new theoretical framework to understand the role of threats in terrorism. Interviews of IRA members give rise to a speech/kinetic action model of terrorism, in which threats and violence jointly determine the physical consequences and political messages conveyed by terrorist attacks. In fact, threats are integral to the attack, and some attacks can be said to consist of threats alone. IRA interviews reveal four varieties of threats: warnings, hoaxes, pledges, and bluffs. These categories are distinguished by the timing of the threatened violence (immediate or prospective) and the intended truthfulness of the threat. The IRA interviews establish the function of each type of threat in influencing the beliefs or behavior of state and society. Threats may disrupt the economy, increase or decrease bloodshed, control social behavior, secure tactical or strategic advantage, claim attacks, aggrandize the perpetrator, and facilitate bargaining. A single threat may serve several of these functions, signaling different messages to different audiences. In fact, this is one of the most important applications of threats. When violence alone would produce suboptimal outcomes, threats alter the pattern of damage in a way that optimizes militants’ messaging for all audiences.
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| 8 |
ID:
089339
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Christopher J. Fettweis argues that too many post-September 11 analyses of terrorism seem to regard the phenomenon as brand new. Terrorism has existed throughout history, and its groups come in two forms: nationalist and ideological. This simple binary typology illuminates a number of important characteristics of terrorism, from group strategy and tactics to overall life expectancy. Perhaps most important, counter-terrorism measures that prove effective against groups in one category will often fail against those in the other.
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| 9 |
ID:
134443
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| Summary/Abstract |
Utilizing interviews with former Irish Republican Army (IRA) members, Loyalists, and community workers, the article looks at how militants in Northern Ireland have helped to prevent terrorism and political violence (TPV) by adopting roles in the community. By using mobile phones, a network of former combatants emerged around interface areas in the late 1990s to contain trigger causes of terrorism, providing a unique role that the state could not. The structure of the network encouraged militant groups to follow the IRA's example to disengage—thus creating a domino effect—and the co-operation between senior militants has limited the opportunities for other groups to mobilize a campaign of terrorism.
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| 10 |
ID:
118451
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| 11 |
ID:
190717
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| Summary/Abstract |
This essay seeks to understand how since the signing of the Good Friday Agreement in 1998, marking the end of The Troubles in Northern Ireland, filmic depictions of the conflict reinterpret and interrogate the traditional role of the ‘hero’ in the Irish republican cause. In an analysis of two films released after the Good Friday Agreement, Hunger (2008) and The Wind that Shakes the Barley (2006), this essay argues that both films feature a hero-type Irish republican waging a brave-but-futile campaign against British oppression, but critique the myth of the Irish republican hero by severing the cycle of mythical violence by sowing doubt in the hero myth that serves as its base. This essay suggests that film is a low-stakes arena for the interrogation of volatile narratives that plays an important role in the reconceptualization of a conflict and, maybe even, its resolution.
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| 12 |
ID:
113269
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Despite an increasing number of attacks by violent anti-Good Friday Agreement (GFA) Republicans from 2009 there is still relatively little understanding of the nature of these organizations or the likely longevity of their campaign(s). This analysis argues that the current upsurge of violence is likely to continue for the foreseeable future, due to a combination of factors that entrench republican ideology. The fractured nature of anti-GFA groups and the declining stature of the Provisional movement are key factors that energize anti-agreement sentiment. In particular, this study identifies the Internet as one of the most significant emerging drivers in that it has the potential to sustain social networks that create and reinforce a traditional minded Irish Republican constituency implacably committed to using violence in pursuit of its goals.
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| 13 |
ID:
096701
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article will seek to provide a detailed examination of the IRA's operational intelligence methodologies. Providing not only a lengthy discussion on the organization's intelligence collection protocols, it will also examine the interplay between intelligence and IRA decision-making. It will be contended that intelligence's influence resided in its ability to introduce a strong element of predictability into the IRA's decision-making process. This depended on an ability to construct a detailed intelligence picture of the target and its geographical milieu so as to minimize the likelihood of volunteers encountering unforeseen circumstances that could adversely affect planned or anticipated outcomes.
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| 14 |
ID:
094077
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The collection of intelligence, whether by the Irish Republican Army (IRA) or the British security forces, became a means and, indeed, an extension of the struggle by which each side sought to assert its dominance and control over the direction and tempo of the Northern Ireland conflict. The implications of this intelligence war were far-reaching, impinging on almost every aspect of the conflict. In addition to its more obvious impact, such as its capacity to determine the outcome of individual operations, intelligence could also influence the conflict in more subtle ways. For instance, the security force's ability to acquire quality intelligence minimized the need to conduct house searches, a practice which proved immensely unpopular among the Nationalist community. From the earliest stages of the Troubles, both sides were engaged in a do or die struggle to control the flow of intelligence. For each, intelligence was crucial to assuring certainty and control for itself, while depriving both from the enemy. For both sides this became the function of counterintelligence.
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| 15 |
ID:
060624
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| Edition |
New ed.
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| Publication |
London, Zed Books Limited, 1988.
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| Description |
xvii, 395p.Pbk
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| Standard Number |
0862327652
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 032152 | 941.60824/KEL 032152 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 16 |
ID:
159904
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| Summary/Abstract |
More than a decade on, the Northern Ireland peace process can largely be considered a success. Despite the failure of the Provisional Republican Movement to achieve a united Ireland free of British control, the large-scale violence of “The Troubles” has been relegated to the past. Applying the logic of coercive diplomacy, this study examines the role of threats and the use of selective and limited violence by the Provisional Movement to manage real and potential opponents and challengers that have emerged within its own ideological ranks to maintain its position of dominance and prevent a spoiling of the peace process. This study shows that the Provisional Movement retained the capability to employ violence and demonstrated the credibility of coercive threat through a willingness to use force against its opponents on the Republican spectrum, and was able to do so with a high degree of impunity.
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| 17 |
ID:
068577
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| Publication |
Cambridge, Polity Press, 2006.
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| Description |
x, 259p.: table.Pbk
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| Standard Number |
074563141X
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 051081 | 941.60824/TON 051081 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 18 |
ID:
105987
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article continues a discussion begun in the 1990s on the degree to which Provisional Irish Republican Army activities were sectarian. Henry Patterson's recent contribution raises issues that concern not only interpretations of the Irish conflict but also have implications for the more general study of the causes and consequences of political violence and terrorism. After addressing some of these issues, Patterson's contribution is placed more firmly into the framework of the previous discussion. Then follows a careful examination of Irish Republican Army attacks on the locally recruited security forces in Fermanagh and South Tyrone, from the 1950s to today.
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| 19 |
ID:
023284
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| Publication |
Dec 2002.
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| Description |
20-21
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| 20 |
ID:
097154
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