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| 1 |
ID:
139499
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| Summary/Abstract |
The use of cyber operations, as well as the interaction of other elements of power that have an effect on cyber operations, represents another method by which nations and non-state actors may attempt to achieve political ends. The Syrian civil war has encompassed many elements of warfare, including cyber operations. A study of the observed cyber operations by both direct and indirect participants in the Syrian civil war can lead to valuable lessons regarding who operates in the cyber domain, what these operators can accomplish, and how a nation-state can respond. These lessons may be applied to future conflicts.
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| 2 |
ID:
143014
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| Summary/Abstract |
As the Obama administration's tenure winds down and the United States withdraws nearly all of its troops from Afghanistan, debates about the nature and scale of future U.S. involvement in Afghanistan continue. President Obama has committed to withdrawing all but a minor residual force by the end of 2016. On the other hand, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani has called for a sizeable U.S. military presence long after President Obama leaves office, and recent setbacks in Iraq have strengthened the hand of Congressional leaders, U.S. military officers, and others who call for an enduring commitment.
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| 3 |
ID:
147047
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| Summary/Abstract |
After a decade and a half of counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. policymakers want to change their approach to COIN by providing aid and advice to local governments rather than directly intervening with U.S. forces. Both this strategy and U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine in general, however, do not acknowledge the difficulty of convincing clients to follow U.S. COIN prescriptions. The historical record suggests that, despite a shared aim of defeating an insurgency, the United States and its local partners have had significantly different goals, priorities, and interests with respect to the conduct of their counterinsurgency campaigns. Consequently, a key focus of attention in any future counterinsurgency assistance effort should be on shaping the client state's strategy and behavior. Although it is tempting to think that providing significant amounts of aid will generate the leverage necessary to affect a client's behavior and policies, the U.S. experience in assisting the government of El Salvador in that country's twelve-year civil war demonstrates that influence is more likely to flow from tight conditions on aid than from boundless generosity.
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| 4 |
ID:
187231
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article is an investigation of declassified archival documents of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) that questions the direct involvement of several U.S. administrations in military coups in Turkey during the Cold War. Among the U.S. government institutions, it is argued that only the CIA could have had the competency for covert participation in a coup plot abroad. Other than the indirect role of the U.S. in military takeovers, due to its military and financial assistance in pre-coup periods, and the political recognition of coup regimes, available CIA documents do not present any tangible evidence for agency’s direct involvement in Turkish military coups, in contrast to its clandestine operations in other states.
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