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ID: 143690

Conditions for sanctions success : a comparison of the Iranian and North Korean cases / Kwon, Bo Ram

Kwon, Bo Ram	Article
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Summary/Abstract

Why were economic sanctions able to produce successful political outcomes in Iran but not in North Korea during 2006–2015? Experts have argued that sanctions are not really effective in changing a state’s objectionable policies or behavior. However, such conclusions should not be drawn without a close examination of the complex environment under which sanctions are imposed. This paper attempts to identify the conditions of sanctions success by comparing the economic sanctions imposed on Iran and North Korea. It begins with a critical assessment of extant evaluations of sanctions imposed on North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons program. Next, it examines Iran sanctions to identify the factors that facilitated the resumption of nuclear talks in 2013 and led to a political agreement in 2015. Subsequently, this is compared with North Korea sanctions to explain why sanctions were more effective in Iran. Finally, the paper extrapolates the conditions for sanctions success that incorporate the political and economic characteristics of the states involved as well as the sanctions policy per se. The paper concludes with a discussion of the lessons learned.

Key Words

Economic Sanctions ; Iran ; North Korea ; Nuclear Weapons Program

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ID: 139791

When are sanctions effective? a bargaining and enforcement framework / Bapat, Navin A; Kwon, Bo Ram

Bapat, Navin A	Article
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Although a considerable literature identifies the conditions under which sanctions are more likely to be successful, few studies examine the question of when sanctioning states or senders are willing to enforce their sanctions laws against their firms. Using a game theoretic model, we argue that imposing sanctions creates a strategic dilemma for senders. We demonstrate that senders often have disincentives to enforce their sanctions policies, given that the restriction on economic transactions with targeted states may undermine their firms' competitiveness. The model indicates that sanctions are more likely to succeed when the sender's firm retains a moderate share of the target's market relative to its foreign competitors. However, the model also demonstrates that sanctions are likely to be imposed only when the conditions do not favor their success. The empirical implications of the model are tested using the Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions (TIES) data set.

Key Words

Bargaining ; Economic Transactions ; Strategic Dilemma ; Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions ; TIES ; Sanctions Effective ;
Enforcement Framework ; Game Theoretic Model

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