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| 1 |
ID:
194313
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article delves into a military court’s quest to determine the nature of one Palestinian death by an Israeli soldier as exceptional or banal. The court’s rejection of selective enforcement claims in Azaria’s trial for Al-Sharif’s killing allows unpacking Israeli settler society’s indifference to Palestinian deaths. As I show, the logic of open fire regulations strips these deaths of their singularity and political meaning, constructs them as an exceptional repetition, and sets them aside even when soldiers are prosecuted for killing Palestinians. Exploring whether a different epistemology could account for the singular yet repetitive nature of Palestinians’ deaths in Israel, I turn to Deleuze. His understanding of repetition as the maximality of differences and reversal of the order of trauma lead me to conclude that the state of Israel does not repeat (killing Palestinians) because it represses (the death of Palestinians). It represses because it repeats.
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| 2 |
ID:
194733
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article delves into a military court’s quest to determine the nature of one Palestinian death by an Israeli soldier as exceptional or banal. The court’s rejection of selective enforcement claims in Azaria’s trial for Al-Sharif’s killing allows unpacking Israeli settler society’s indifference to Palestinian deaths. As I show, the logic of open fire regulations strips these deaths of their singularity and political meaning, constructs them as an exceptional repetition, and sets them aside even when soldiers are prosecuted for killing Palestinians. Exploring whether a different epistemology could account for the singular yet repetitive nature of Palestinians’ deaths in Israel, I turn to Deleuze. His understanding of repetition as the maximality of differences and reversal of the order of trauma lead me to conclude that the state of Israel does not repeat (killing Palestinians) because it represses (the death of Palestinians). It represses because it repeats.
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| 3 |
ID:
139849
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| Summary/Abstract |
Despite the government’s decades-long enforcement efforts, violations of land laws and regulations remain a serious problem in China. Local governments have often been blamed. This article identifies a previously overlooked reason for large-scale violations, by examining the enforcement behavior of the central government. It argues that the government enforces land regulations selectively, depending on the violators’ political status. The article focuses on the national policy prohibiting new golf course construction, finding that golf course developers connected with high-level political élites are more likely to violate the prohibition and survive subsequent enforcement actions by the central government. This finding contributes to the literature on regulatory enforcement in authoritarian regimes and has broad implications for reforms in China.
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