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| 1 |
ID:
135924
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| Summary/Abstract |
During the Second World War the United States sent billions of dollars worth of military equipment and supplies to the Soviet Union through the Lend-Lease program. In the Soviet official memory of the war, however, Lend-Lease aid was either marginalized or disappeared completely. Past scholars and even Soviet rulers have given different reasons for this amnesia, which often include a paranoid Stalin or high tensions during the Cold War. This essay argues instead that Marx’s ideology was mainly responsible for marginalizing the memory of U.S. aid to the Soviet Union. For many, World War II legitimized the Soviet’s collective economy. The memory of aid from the capitalist West did not fit the ideological narrative and thus was forgotten. It also demonstrates how memory can be shaped to fit an ideological view.
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| 2 |
ID:
135920
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The personnel structure and recruitment of armed forces represent major elements of civil-military relations and civilian control. Particularly crucial is the moment of shift from one type of recruitment to another and the factors that facilitate or impede it. The focus of this paper is the case of the Russian Federation during the Medvedev presidency, when renewed efforts were made to cut back conscription in favor of a professional contract-based force. Despite crucial incidents, such as the 2008 Russian-Georgian War that spelled out once more the prevailing inertia of the Russian conscript-based army, military elites have been opposed to a change of the status quo. By analyzing exemplary ideational discourses based on the discursive institutional approach, factors will be elaborated that explain what continues to impede the shift to contract-based recruitment in Russia. In the light of the latest hostilities between Russia and NATO, the prospect of this shift has receded even further into the distance.
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| 3 |
ID:
135925
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When studying the battle for Kursk, one of the climactic engagements in the German-Soviet war (1941–1945), many authors have maintained that the Germans would have won the battle had they not delayed their attack from May until early July 1943. This article subjects that assertion to recently released archival materials to conclude that this premise is patently incorrect.
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| 4 |
ID:
135927
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article is the second installment of a three-part study into combat at the tactical level in the battle of Smolensk in 1941. The preceding article published in Journal of Slavic Military Studies (Volume 26, Issue 4) documented the formation, movement, and initial assignments given to 900th Rifle Regiment before it engaged the enemy. This article picks up with the regiment’s first engagement on 25 July 1941 against the elements of the German 3rd Panzer Group and takes us through 5 August 1941, when the regiment was engaged with elements of the German 9th Army and applied new tactics of night combat. Chronologically this article corresponds to events described in Barbarossa Derailed, Chapter 5: The First Soviet Counteroffensive, and the Struggle for the Smolensk Pocket 24–31 July 1941, and Chapter 7: Armeegruppe Guderian’s Destruction of Group Kachalov and the Reduction of the Smolensk Pocket, 31 July–6 August 1941.1
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| 5 |
ID:
135923
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| Summary/Abstract |
Prior to the war, young Jewish soldiers turned out to be largely a loyal group within the Red Army toward the Bolshevik regime. However, akin to the general population, some Jewish soldiers and officers, whether in the ‘core’ Soviet Union or in the new territories, were dissatisfied with or even resentful of the regime. The German attack on the USSR promptly transformed all Jewish soldiers and officers into the staunchest anti-Nazi force and hence, probably one of the most reliable groups in the Red Army.
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| 6 |
ID:
135926
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| Summary/Abstract |
The purpose of this study is to explain the German failure at Stalingrad by comparing the opposing army commanders, Friedrich Paulus and Vasili I. Chuikov. In spite of how close Paulus came to accomplishing his mission, which was to take all of Stalingrad, in the end he failed either to take the city or save his army from destruction. A large part of the reason for this is to be found in Paulus’s leadership, which was far too passive and allowed his subordinates too much discretion. Paulus ensured he was unable to influence events quickly by locating his headquarters some 100 miles from Stalingrad at Nizhne-Chirskaya. Likewise, a large part of the Soviet victory can be attributed to Vasili Chuikov, who made sure, by his hands-on approach and active command style, that the tactical battle was fought his way. It was this difference in command styles that, ultimately, spelled victory for one side and defeat for the other.
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| 7 |
ID:
135929
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The active movement of the Russian Empire to the East for three centuries and its colossal success led to the need for some Russian thinkers and publicists to analyze this unique phenomenon as part of the general European colonial ‘movement’ to the East. The problem became more relevant than ever after the Sino-Japanese war (1894–1895), when the expansion of Russia to the East intensified, and all the world powers started to formulate their interests in China. Conflicts with and around China among these countries became widespread. Here the Russian press played a great role, accompanying and commenting on each step made by Russian diplomats and military. The discussions gradually highlighted two different problems. These were the ideas of ‘yellow peril’ and ‘Russia’s special mission in the East’.
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| 8 |
ID:
135921
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Russian security and foreign policy in the period of Medvedev’s presidency in 2008–2012 was characterized by profound ambivalence. On the one hand, Medvedev promoted the concept of a multilateral world order with a ‘new Russia’—as a restorative power—representing one of its leading centers. On the other hand, the Russian President decided to launch a military campaign against Georgia in August 2008 and subsequently ordered the reform of the Russian armed forces and the modernization of its weapon systems. The Russian president also continued to exaggerate threats to Russian national security and emphasize the possibility of using nuclear weapons. A specific feature of Russian foreign policy of this period was the tendency to use the supplies of energy resources as a political tool. At the same time, it can be observed that although the security cooperation between Russia and the US and NATO was re-established, mutual security relations remained burdened by a number of contentious issues.
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| 9 |
ID:
135928
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| Summary/Abstract |
The author proves that the Soviet economy in the middle of 80s was overestimated as many as 4 times by the Soviet official statistics due to pripiski—deliberately overstated data on the produced goods and services and maximally overestimating the cost of production by using both the most costly raw materials and equipment and an increased number of intermediate operations, each of which is produced in a separate enterprise. All such things cause a dramatic increase in the gross cost of production at the expense of double accounting, but without any increase in the physical volume of output or the improvement of its consumer qualities. Such double accounting is called as ‘imaginary value’. The author estimates the real Soviet GNP as only one sixth of the American one in the middle of 80s. And the Soviet Military expenditures constituted about 42 percent of GNP. ‘Imaginary value’ was a very important means of distribution and re-distribution of goods in the Soviet planned economy.
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| 10 |
ID:
135930
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| Summary/Abstract |
One of the most controversial questions in regard to the Soviet Union’s conduct of the war against Hitler’s Nazi Germany (1941–1945) was the extent to which Joseph Stalin, the country’s ruler, conducted military operations designed to advance the country’s post-war political objectives. Historians, who have long debated this matter, have generally based their judgments on the reality of the post-war structure in Europe—specifically, the establishment of Communist puppet governments behind what Winston Churchill described as the ‘iron curtain’. Truth regarding Stalin’s political intent has generally eluded them because archival documents necessary to validate their conclusions have been unavailable. Now, however, the slow but steady opening of the Soviet Union’s (Russian) military archives provides fresh evidence upon which to judge Stalin’s wartime intent. This article surveys this evidence, principally wartime directives issued by the USSR’s State Defense Committee and Stavka (Supreme High Command), which indicate that Stalin did indeed orchestrate the Red Army’s military operations to secure distinct political objectives within and outside the borders of the pre-war Soviet Union. By no means definitive in its conclusions, the article summons further debate and discussion on this important historical matter.
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| 11 |
ID:
135922
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| Summary/Abstract |
Contemporary military organizations have undergone important changes in terms of values (converging with civilians) and expected performance (diverging from traditional tasks) in multi-national environments. Military leaders were the first to adapt to the changes, since they represent the core of the military profession. This article identifies professional skills and personal characteristics of contemporary military leaders, based on cross-national perceptions of Italian and Slovenian service members. A triangulation of qualitative and quantitative methods reveals that: (1) the military organizational culture is the most important factor supporting multi-national leadership and (2) unlike traditional military leadership, which emphasizes traditional military values and skills, post-modern leadership assigns more importance to emotional and cultural intelligence. Both key findings indicate a cultural gap between the traditional masculine, hierarchical and the flexible, culturally open military organization
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