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| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
140338
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| Summary/Abstract |
In December 2014, the European Union (EU) launched its civilian mission in Ukraine, EU Advisory Mission (EUAM). Although the mission's main purpose is to mentor and advice Ukrainian officials on civilian Security Sector Reform, this article argues that EUAM's deployment was driven by a broader geopolitical logic, that is, to soft balance Russia. Following Russia's annexation of Crimea in March 2014, international perceptions of Moscow's intentions turned increasingly ambivalent. Due to EU member states’ divergent interests vis-à-vis Russia and the union's lack of hard balancing capabilities, the only feasible means available to the EU to deal with the situation in Ukraine were diplomatic and economic pressure, that is, sanctions. However, whereas sanctions are designed to compel Russia to solve her ongoing conflict with Ukraine diplomatically, the EU is also undertaking soft balancing measures that allow it to undermine Russia's interests in Ukraine without confronting her directly. Two attributes make EUAM a soft balancing act: firstly, it improves the resilience of the Ukrainian state against Russian influence and pressure; and secondly, it shows political support to the Ukrainian government and people. There currently is a broad consensus among EU member states for supporting Ukraine in almost every way, short of military assistance. Whether or not this support is sustainable in the long run is an open question.
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| 2 |
ID:
144768
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| Summary/Abstract |
In 2014, the European Union (EU) launched the sixth review of the Athena mechanism that finances the common costs of military operations launched in the framework of its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). In the run up to the review, there were expectations that it would improve financial burden sharing in CSDP operations by expanding common funding for them. However, these hopes were disappointed; the review became a diplomatic tug of war between France, the strongest supporter of expanded common funding, and the UK, its strongest opponent. In the end, France agreed to the UK's terms to ensure that the existing level of common funding would not decrease. This article analyses the Athena review from a neoclassical realist perspective. It argues that the review's outcome was due to the imbalance of influence among EU member states and the diverging preferences of their Foreign Policy Executives (FPEs). These factors caused the Athena review to remain in the hands of a small group of member states that had diverging utility expectations and ideological preferences. Thus, the article shows that a surprisingly intense burden-sharing dispute has emerged within CSDP.
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