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| 1 |
ID:
156310
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| 2 |
ID:
163786
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| Summary/Abstract |
Tensions flared for a time after North Korea’s fifth and sixth nuclear tests as well as
THAAD’s entry into South Korea. This paper extends the view that the root cause
of these issues is the lack of regional public goods (RPGs) on the Korean Peninsula,
and its insufficiency results from three major conflicts in the politico–economic
situation of the Peninsula. In order to resolve the issues and maintain lasting peace,
three specific aspects, i.e., in diplomacy, security and economy, are to be addressed
in carrying out the long-term mission of supplying RPGs to the Peninsula. For
effective operation and comprehensive management of the RPGs provision, an
integration platform with powerful commitments is called for, i.e., “Association of
Trans-Korean Peninsula Nations” (ATKPN) co-established by China, the United
States, and the two Koreas. Apart from the dilemma commonly identified in the
delivery of RPGs, the ATKPN also faces dilemmas specifically from the Northeast
Asian order. To overcome the ATKPN’s obstacles, concerted efforts are needed to
promote the institutionalization of Sino–U.S. “new type of great power relations,”
to transform the function of the alliance system, and to cultivate the awareness of
“common external threats.”
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| 3 |
ID:
154579
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| 4 |
ID:
158052
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| Summary/Abstract |
The view that China would not “abandon” North Korea, despite repeated provocations by North Korea, has been strengthened in the context of the US pivot to Asia, which is generally regarded by Chinese strategists as Washington's ploy to contain China. As the rivalry and competition between Washington and Beijing deepen, North Korea's strategic value to China increases. However, history shows that Beijing regarded Pyongyang as “expendable” even during the Korean War. Based on Sino–North Korean historical relations, in this article we argue that China's policy toward North Korea is not fixed but fluid, and that Washington and Seoul could inspire changes within China's policy toward North Korea.
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| 5 |
ID:
174732
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Seoul and Washington have conceded that Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) in South Korea cannot protect the capital region of Republic of Korea (ROK), including Seoul and Incheon, from North Korea’s missile attacks. Why did the South Korean government decide to deploy THAAD, risking possible retaliation from China, although it already knew its limited utility on the Korean peninsula? This article addresses the puzzle by connecting the deployment of THAAD in South Korea with the U.S. conception of a strategic rebalancing to Asia. By linking South Korea’s decision to deploy THAAD with contemporary alliance politics, extended deterrence, and abandonment and entrapment risks, it argues that Seoul’s THAAD decision was primarily intended to sustain and strengthen the U.S.-ROK alliance amid escalating nuclear threats by North Korea and deepening Sino-American rivalry.
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| 6 |
ID:
150320
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| Summary/Abstract |
Lost in the countryside, a city slicker stops to ask a farmer for directions. The farmer replies laconically, “Well, I wouldn’t start from here.” Starting from here is the sort of advice President Donald Trump is likely to get when he asks about North Korea.
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| 7 |
ID:
156312
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| 8 |
ID:
154201
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| 9 |
ID:
158630
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| Summary/Abstract |
This paper examines how South Korea might be able to deter the growing threat from North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missile programs. North Korea’s six nuclear weapons experiments with various types of missile test fires using solid fuel and new technology pose a security threat to South Korea and the USA. The credibility of the North’s WMD capability and the military balance of two Koreas are critically analyzed. South Korea’s superior conventional weapons system, supported by U.S. strategic weapons and intelligence systems, could fend off North Korean nuclear weapons and missile attacks. However, it is imperative that the U.S.-ROK alliance continues to develop a stringent nuclear deterrence strategy and deploy a series of countermeasures, including preemptive strikes and a multilayered missile defense system, such as Kill Chain, KAMD, and THAAD, all to guard against a potential nuclear weapon attack from North Korea.
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| 10 |
ID:
140523
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Nuclear-related issues remain at the core of the Seoul-Washington partnership. These include shared nuclear weapons threats to both partners from North Korea, tussles between South Koreans and Americans regarding how to deter and defeat these North Korean threats without antagonizing the other regional nuclear powers, and managing the transformation of the Republic of Korea (ROK) into a major civilian nuclear energy producer and exporter. Whatever the changes in the Northeast Asian security environment, the enduring goals of the South KoreanU.S. defense alliance remain unchanged—to deter North Korean aggression, maintain South Koreans’ security and welfare, contribute to regional and global stability, and work toward Korean reunification. But the shifting nature of the regional security environment has required difficult adjustments by both partners to sustain a robust and effective partnership.
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| 11 |
ID:
156308
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| 12 |
ID:
156475
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| Summary/Abstract |
North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear arms, and the U.S. effort to stop it, date back to the
1990s. In mid-1994, the United States was ready to use force—to launch a surgical
strike with cruise missiles on the North Korean reprocessing facility at Yongbyon,
which produces plutonium–the material for the nuclear bomb. At the last minute,
North Korea’s leader Kim Il Sung invited former U.S. president Jimmy Carter to
Pyongyang to salvage the crisis. Thereafter, the United States and North Korean
officials met in Geneva and worked out a deal, the Agreed Framework, in December
1994, thereby Pyongyang agreed to suspend its plutonium program, while the
United States, the ROK and Japan would build two light-water reactors for North
Korea to generate electric power. The Americans find North Korean officials
skillful in deception and duplicity, which is rather difficult to deal with. In spite of
their public commitments, the North Koreans are determined to possess nuclear
arms and find ways to continue their quest. They also excel in brinkmanship—they
provoke and make trouble, and then extol concessions/rewards for cooperation.
President Donald Trump, much like his predecessors, erroneously believes that
China is willing and has the economic leverage and political influence to rein in
Pyongyang’s leadership. Hence, Trump has tried to “outsource” North Korea’s
nuclear threat to Chinese leader Xi Jinping in the wake of their summit meeting in
April. Trump has offered a better trade deal to China, but Xi has been reluctant–
to White House officials, Trump’s “bet” is not paying off. As the threat perception
of China and the United States is different, and the interest and agenda of the two
nations in the Asia–Pacific are also vastly different, Xi cannot be expected to do
Trump’s bidding on North Korea. Xi’s primary concern is to prevent U.S. military
attacks on North Korea that would result in the collapse of Kim Jong Un’s regime,
and a pro-U.S. government in North Korea. Nor does Xi want to implement heavy
sanctions on Pyongyang which could destabilize Kim’s regime and drive hundreds
of thousands of refugees into China.
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| 13 |
ID:
156309
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