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| 1 |
ID:
140407
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| Summary/Abstract |
Rising East Asian maritime tensions between China and its neighbors since 2009 without military conflict are explained by compelling factors including China’s assertiveness, the expanding US regional presence, territorial defiance by China’s neighbors, and restraining factors including Beijing’s “struggle without breaking” policy guideline, the US accommodation school, and neighbors’ hedging strategy.
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| 2 |
ID:
140405
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| Summary/Abstract |
CHINA’S MARITIME PERIPHERY OR ‘‘NEAR SEAS—the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, and the South China Sea—are waters through which a great deal of vital commerce flows, as China, Japan, Korea, and numerous Southeast Asian countries are all major trading nations that import the energy and raw materials that sustain their thriving economies. Since 2009 the East and South China Seas have become increasingly fraught with tension. This has generally been attributed to rising Chinese assertiveness, but not because China has started making a lot of assertions it never made before. As the authors assembled here point out in replete detail, China’s explicit claims to the Diaoyu/Senkaku islets in the East China Sea date back at least to 1971, while it can trace its claim in the South China Sea back to the publication of the famous ‘‘nine-dashed line’’ map by the Nationalists in 1947 (at the time it contained eleven segmented lines; the victorious Communists subsequently dropped two).
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| 3 |
ID:
140408
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article surveys the discussion and debate in China over the nine-dashed line in recent years, with special focus on the efforts of scholars and think-tank experts to legitimize the nine-dashed line and their interactions with the Chinese public and policymakers through public media.
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| 4 |
ID:
140410
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| Summary/Abstract |
Despite frequent talk of conflict and even war, economic and strategic factors suggest that the Sino–Japanese dispute over the East China Sea will not erupt into hot conflict, at least for the time being. However, for domestic reasons, overt cooperation remains a distant prospect.
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| 5 |
ID:
140409
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article addresses Japan’s role in maritime security in the South China Sea. It identifies Tokyo’s three main policy tools: regional multilateralism, ODA, and JCG aid to littoral states in the form of equipment and capacity building. Barring a major external shock Tokyo will continue playing a more active but low-key role.
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| 6 |
ID:
140406
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| Summary/Abstract |
The article looks at three ways in which international law has affected government behavior in the South China Sea. It has exacerbated disputes. It has probably curtailed the use of force. And it has made it difficult to imagine solutions that violate the law of the sea.
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| 7 |
ID:
140412
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| Summary/Abstract |
Using a conflict transformation framework, this article demonstrates that positive transformations have taken place in the South China Sea between 1991 and 2007. Even though these transformations have been weakened in recent years, particularly regarding the actor aspect, it is concluded that a major armed conflict is still highly unlikely.
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| 8 |
ID:
140413
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| Summary/Abstract |
The study analyzes disputes and dispute management in the South China Sea. The progress made is outlined through an overview and analysis of formally settled disputes. The unsettled disputes are identified, analyzed, and assessed. The study concludes with a broader assessment from the perspective of dispute management.
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| 9 |
ID:
140411
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article assesses Southeast Asian views of the US “rebalance,” examining reactions to US military deployments, military assistance to partners, and support for Southeast Asian diplomacy on South China Sea conflicts. Although not ostensibly designed to contain China, the rebalance provides Southeast Asia with hedging options against more assertive PRC actions in the South China Sea.
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