| Summary/Abstract |
By examining America's handling of the Phantom sale to Israel in light of the Middle East peace initiative, this paper will contend that, prior to the birth of America's unequivocal pro-Israeli stance, the Johnson administration viewed the Israeli–Jordanian negotiations simply as a spur to the neighboring Arab states to agree peace terms, thereby stemming the Soviet influence. Using the Phantom deal as leverage to coax Israel towards peace, while also reassuring them vis-à-vis national security, would therefore help peace become a reality. However, the approach failed, and so the Johnson administration had no choice but to give Israel the Phantoms, without exacting any corresponding peace concessions. This paper will therefore contend that the Phantom sale epitomized the failure of the Johnson administration's peace initiative, concluding that not only the power of lobbying and Israel's increasing strategic importance, but also this very failure, helped create America's de facto pro-Israeli policy.
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