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| 1 |
ID:
140489
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Chinese public's domestic expectation is that its state will ensure a safe and affordable supply of food. However, in doing so, China has acquired large amounts of farmland abroad which has raised concerns among many developing countries. It has been argued that land grabbing in the developing world is a form of neo-colonialism. This role of a colonial power is in conflict with China's historical role, which presents China as a leader of the developing world. In order to bring these role expectations into conformity with each other, China has taken a more active role in global food security governance. It has brought food security to what is becoming the core of the global governance decision-making system, the G20. China's historical role, together with its growing economic power, has helped to push the G20 to understand the importance of food security. This has shifted the G20's understanding of economic global governance away from the traditional fields of banking and trade regulation toward understanding the developmental-oriented economic structure.
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| 2 |
ID:
140487
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Since the outbreak of the Arab revolts in late 2010, China has adhered to its ‘business-first’ economic diplomacy towards the Arab countries, a policy driven by China's ongoing geoeconomic interests. The ten-year-old China–Arab States Cooperation Forum serves as the nucleus for China's economic diplomacy in the region. The Chinese authorities have also initiated interagency coordination and central–local governments' power sharing in order to pursue this diplomacy successfully. However, while its economic diplomacy may be evolving, China, unlike what it has achieved in Black Africa, seems to have failed to develop strategic, political and cultural exchanges with its Arab counterparts. The intertwined geopolitical and geoeconomic factors that have emerged since the Arab revolts might make it harder for China to reap economic benefits while shelving political entanglement to sustain this economic diplomacy in the longer run.
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| 3 |
ID:
140479
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This article examines China's development of its C-919 large passenger aircraft through the lens of Porter's Determinant Model. The model serves as a blueprint for analyzing what China must do to increase its probability of developing a competitive, large passenger aircraft. Success in the industry can be achieved best by developing technologically advanced aircraft and selling a sufficient number to develop economies of scale. To explore underlying questions of what China is doing right and what areas need improvement, the author interviewed key aviation professionals and sampled the limited publications on the topic in both English and Chinese.
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| 4 |
ID:
140484
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This article examines Sino–Australian economic relations, and their impact on the ties between the United States and Australia. First, drawing on power transition theory, it is argued that in a post-Cold War environment, economic ties play as great a role as strategic relations in determining the orientation of third-party states. Second, it is also argued that Australia's deeper economic and commercial ties with China have usurped a role previously held by the United States. This has forced Australia to pursue a bifurcated foreign policy—one split between its economic and national security needs. Third, these deeper ties with China have generated a degree of alliance drift between Australia and the United States. As a result, there is now a significant debate in Australia over the future of both bilateral relations—even as its space for policy innovation remains limited.
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| 5 |
ID:
140486
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The Pacific Islands region might be regarded as one of the most remote and politically least significant areas in the geopolitical and economic considerations of world giants. However, as the regional order of the Asia–Pacific changes rapidly, China has shown more eagerness to engage the island states. Interestingly, Beijing's former arch-rival Taipei still maintains, arguably, considerable influence over the region. This raises a question that is thought-provoking: why is this status quo tolerated by Beijing? Drawing on empirical sources in relation to communication between Beijing, Taipei and these island states, by focusing on how Beijing handles the South Pacific region in general and the six non-recognizing states in particular, this article attempts to tackle the question by distinguishing the difference in Beijing's mentality today from that of 30 or 40 years ago. It argues that the zero-sum mentality of fighting against Taipei in the region has now been replaced by a positive-sum assumption to engage Taipei, as well as the pan-Chinese community in the world, via the PIS, regardless of whether they establish formal ties with Beijing or not.
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| 6 |
ID:
140488
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| Summary/Abstract |
The growing economic presence of China around the world is a widely recognized reality. China's expanding economic relations with other developing countries have generated both positive and negative reactions. Many believe that the increasing economic ties between China and these countries will enhance China's political influence and encourage political cooperation between China and other countries in the Global South. How strong is the economic–political link? This article examines this question in the context of Sino–Latin American relations in recent years. It finds that thus far China's expanding economic relations with the region have not had a significant spillover effect into the political realm. The article provides preliminary explanations of the missing link between the economic and the political. It calls for more nuanced ways to apply familiar international relations paradigms to understanding the implications of the rise of China.
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| 7 |
ID:
140478
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One of the greatest challenges facing China today is the central government's ability to ensure that policies are implemented effectively at the local level, particularly policies that seek to make China's economic growth model more sustainable. These policies face resistance from local authorities and enterprises that benefit from the status quo. This raises a key research question: why do some provinces more fully implement these central policies? We argue the extent of local implementation is best conceptualized as a rational balance between economic and political incentives: localities with regulatory autonomy, low regulatory capacity and alternative interests will not fully implement policies that are at odds with local economic imperatives. By examining a critical case of central policy implementation—industrial energy intensity reduction in the eleventh five-year plan—this article demonstrates that, regardless of industrial makeup or economic development, provinces that have greater regulatory autonomy for noncompliance coupled with alternative economic interests do not, on average, perform as well. Using a nested analysis approach this study illustrates this argument with both quantitative analysis and original case study evidence from fieldwork interviews.
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| 8 |
ID:
140476
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In the case of land transfer in rural China, why do some village cadres act as entrepreneurs, some become middlemen between agribusinesses and peasants, and others choose to be passive bystanders? Based on comparative case studies in Shandong province, it is argued that state power, rather than village elections, informal solidary groups and economic benefits, is the dominant explanatory mechanism. This article suggests that our discussion of the state–village cadre relationship should not be limited to the control perspective. To achieve policy objectives, village cadres' ability and creativity are as important as motivation to local government. Substantial support makes village cadres more capable, and some degree of leeway is necessary for creativity. Local government relies on three forms of leverage (control, support and non-intervention) to address three issues (motivation, ability and creativity) in shaping behavioral patterns of village cadres.
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| 9 |
ID:
140485
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Chinese development assistance, raw material exploitation, investment and trade increases in their region are causing Pacific Islanders to ask: ‘Why are the Chinese interested in Pacific Island states?’ and ‘Why has there been an upsurge of the Chinese influence in the Pacific?’. This article seeks to add to the debate on that issue by examining the nature and the evolving purpose of Chinese engagement with the small island states of the Pacific. Only a small proportion of China's outbound investment goes to the Pacific Islands, but it has a considerable effect on the region's economically dependent states. Pacific Island nations have a pressing need for overseas investment and are highly dependent on development assistance. They are, therefore, particularly vulnerable to external players.
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| 10 |
ID:
140475
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This article discusses the rationale for, and progress to date of, creating a National Security Commission in China, a move first announced in late 2013. Central impulses for the Commission's establishment are to help better coordinate a very fragmented bureaucracy and to advance Xi Jinping's drive to consolidate his personal power over the internal and external coercive and diplomatic arms of the governing structure. The Commission is a work in progress and its full institutional maturation will take a protracted period. In the midst of the Commission's construction, there is considerable confusion among subordinates in the foreign policy and security areas about lines of authority and ultimate objectives. Beyond Xi Jinping, it is difficult to discern an authoritative voice. It is an open question as to whether this institutional attempt to achieve coordination will improve, or further complicate, China's long-standing coordination problem, some recent foreign policy achievements notwithstanding. The Commission's focus is heavily weighted toward internal and periphery security, but it also is an institution-building response to new global and transnational issues. It is not self-evident that Xi, or any single individual, can effectively manage the span of control he is constructing.
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