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ID:
179531
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| Summary/Abstract |
Abe Shinzō’s long duration in office brought to Japan strategic vision, international respect, and a forward-leaning commitment to strengthen Japan’s defenses and uphold the major tenants of the international order. This article examines Abe’s achievements in the security and foreign policy domains. Specifically, it examines his domestic achievements in establishing the National Security Strategy and National Security Council, reinterpreting Japan’s ability to exercise its right to collective self-defense, passing a suite of security legislation, and strengthening of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces. It also examines Abe’s foreign policy achievements of increasing Japan’s international presence and global role, expanding Japans’ strategic ties, creating and exporting a strategic framing vision called the Free and Open Indo-Pacific, and helping to establish the grouping of four maritime democracies called the Quad. The article argues that Abe’s desire for Japan to play a larger, more proactive role helped leave Japan—and the region—in a stronger place.
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| 2 |
ID:
141493
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| Summary/Abstract |
Abe Shinzō has pledged to “take Japan back” from its constraining postwar regime. Redesigned institutions for intelligence and security policy coordination and “proactive pacifism” have facilitated the exercise of collective self-defense and strengthened the US–Japan alliance. The evolving security system is accelerating the dilution of Japan’s pacifist norms.
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| 3 |
ID:
175658
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| Summary/Abstract |
In what ways are Japanese foreign and security policies changing? How far will these changes go? Will they result in a policy posture that breaks from the post-1945 approach as originally designed by Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru? This special issue presents six articles that address these questions. They tackle the relationship between recent changes in Japanese domestic policy institutions and Japanese diplomatic and security practice. In this introduction, we outline the significance of the essays’ findings and propose a methodological shift in the interpretation of Japanese policy. We make the case that Japan’s approach to diplomatic and security affairs under Abe is evidence of the emergence of a ‘Realpolitik Japan’. From this perspective, we argue that values and political ideology have translated into practical choices that make the question of the ‘break with the post-1945’ approach less relevant to understand the significance of political change.
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| 4 |
ID:
145432
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| Summary/Abstract |
The year 2015 revolved around Prime Minister Abe Shinzō, who led his Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) to a resounding electoral victory in December 2014, thus opening the door for the LDP and its coalition partner Komeito to pass a major revision of Japan’s security policy, despite public outcry and over a fragmented field of opposition parties.
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| 5 |
ID:
160386
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| Summary/Abstract |
Japanese domestic politics grew more volatile and complex in 2017, as LDP electoral reversals were followed by opposition fragmentation and then conservative consolidation. Foreign policy was dominated by the security challenge of North Korea, but also involved deepened relations with the US and Europe, as well as unanticipated improvement with China and South Korea. Macroeconomic trends were positive, but structural reform proceeded only slowly. Japanese society remained slow to change.
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| 6 |
ID:
175660
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines the significance of the changes in Japan’s arms export policy following Prime Minister Abe Shinzō’s return to power in 2012—a topic which has so far received insufficient scholarly attention. Established in the 1960s and 1970s, Japan’s ‘virtual’ ban on arms exports was an expression of the country’s postwar anti-militarism. Yet, in keeping with Japan’s increasingly active role in security affairs, Abe lifted the ban on weapons exports in 2014. Within the Ministry of Defense, a new agency was installed to oversee the arms industry and to promote military-related research and weapons transfers. We show that the Abe administration conceives of arms exports and related cooperation as an integral part of its national security strategy. Tokyo not only hopes to improve the competitiveness of its own defence industry, but also seeks to cement existing and new security partnerships while contributing to regional capacity building as a hedge against a rising China. The actual ramifications of this policy change are far from clear yet, however. A major constraint for policymaking is the reluctance of the defence sector to embrace arms export due to the associated business risks including the fear of tarnishing their corporate image.
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| 7 |
ID:
145683
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| Summary/Abstract |
The politics of Japanese agricultural reform is rapidly changing. Once dependent on foreign pressure, reform is now fueled by a deepening farm crisis and a breakdown in postwar political alignments. Focusing on the Abe government’s reform of Japan Agricultural Cooperatives, we explore Japan’s expanding capacity for executive leadership in the farm sector on behalf of market-oriented change.
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| 8 |
ID:
151442
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article operationalizes Japanese leadership in foreign and security policy, specifically the Abe administrations’ consistent China balancing. It will do so to dispel instances of Premier-centered diplomacy and posit that Abe's diplomatic agenda has rested on a ‘hybrid’ policy-making authority, where the leverage enjoyed by the Prime Minister's office (the Kantei) rested on little-appreciated politicized personnel appointments and demotions within the bureaucratic apparatus, specifically the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Moreover, successful Japanese leadership has functioned especially when operating within the scope of the US strategic framework towards East Asia. While structural constraints, such as the ever-present influence of the USA and bureaucratic coordination, may constrain options, effective leadership in foreign policy-making can indeed make a difference within those boundaries.
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