Search Result

Srl

Item

ID: 161045

Troublesome peace making: How American views on terrorism affected Norwegian mediation in Sri Lanka, 2000-2009 / Nissen, Ada

Nissen, Ada	Journal Article
	0 Rating(s) & 0 Review(s)

Summary/Abstract

Weak mediators normally need to borrow leverage from more powerful players to provide efficient mediation. This situation requires strong co-operation between the weak mediator and more powerful actors or coalitions involved in a peace process. But what if this co-operation fails? This analysis demonstrates how lack of productive co-operation with the United States negatively affected Norway’s 9-year-long attempt to mediate in the conflict between the Sri Lankan government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam between 2000 and 2009. More specifically, it explores how the United States views on terrorism in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 limited Norway’s room for diplomatic manoeuvre. Based on a unique set of classified sources from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and interviews with key actors, the analysis demonstrates how diverging perceptions of a conflict can make mediation painfully challenging.

Key Words

Terrorism ; LTTE ; Sri Lanka ; America ; Peace Making ; Norwegians ;
200-2009 ; Sri Lankan Government

Links

'Full Text'

In Basket

Export

ID: 141713

Weak third parties and ripening: revisiting norwegian interventions in guatemala and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict / Nissen, Ada; Waage, Hilde Henriksen

Waage, Hilde Henriksen	Article
	0 Rating(s) & 0 Review(s)

Summary/Abstract

Can weak third parties contribute to ripening conflicts for resolution despite their lack of leverage? According to the core principles of ripeness theory, mediators with leverage have a clear advantage when it comes to ripening. What is often overlooked in the literature, however, is the important ways a weak mediator can contribute to ripening as well. This article explores two noteworthy cases of weak third party ripening – the Norwegian roles in the Oslo channel between Israel and the Palestinians, and between the URNGguerrilla and the government in Guatemala. These cases demonstrate how careful interventions by weak third parties can help disputants see negotiations as a way out both in preliminary and later phases of negotiations. However, we also argue that weak third parties should not get involved in ripening unless they can call on a mediator with more leverage once substantial negotiations begin.

Key Words

Israel ; Norway ; Guatemala ; Ripeness ; Palestinian ; Leverage ;
Power Asymmetry ; Back Channels

Links

'Full Text'

In Basket

Export