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| 1 |
ID:
142120
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| Summary/Abstract |
After being initially drafted in 2001 by an expert body—the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty—the “responsibility to protect” (R2P) doctrine has eventually found its way into the 2005 UN World Summit Outcome document, thereby replacing a morally controversial doctrine of “humanitarian intervention”. The paper aims, first, to point out how these two doctrines are different ethical projects. Second, recognizing that it is safer to say that the doctrine has not become a principle of law, this paper tries to situate it within the prevalent value of the international rule of law. It does so by exploring two somewhat contrasting conceptions—one more substantive in nature, which takes individuals as ultimate beneficiaries of this value, and the other, more formal in nature, which puts states in the forefront. The R2P case shows, however, that neither of them can be advanced to the full extent.
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| 2 |
ID:
153889
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| Summary/Abstract |
As new technologies make possible new modes of war, they cause tension in the previously prevailing conceptual categories. This is evident, as the practice of targeted killing by governments has increased in frequency and prominence, largely due to the American use of armed drones around the world. The essays in this special issue explore how norms, rules, and laws that many people thought were settled have been roiled by new technologies of targeted killing. This includes rules on sovereignty, territory, due process, and the distinction between civilian and combatant. The essays sketch an implicit research program around the recursive relation between rules and practice. I draw these out into a more general model for scholarship at the boundaries between law and politics and between concepts and practices.
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| 3 |
ID:
155108
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| Summary/Abstract |
China and Western countries have repeatedly portrayed each other as potential or actual adversaries in cyberspace. Yet, both sides proclaim that they subscribe to an international consensus that cyber operations must be subjected to the rule of law. Against this background, the article examines five key aspects of the rule of law in cyberspace, which are ordinarily understood as areas of contention: (1) preferred method of identification and development of international law; (2) competing models of cyberspace governance; (3) application of sovereignty to cyberspace; (4) question of militarization of cyberspace; and (5) legality of cyber espionage. Our analysis demonstrates that it is inaccurate to view China and the West as sharply divided and competing camps. Rather, the emerging picture reveals a web of relationships and views that reflect an overall trajectory of convergence, even if modest in scope and velocity.
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