| Summary/Abstract |
Oil wealth increases the risk of both authoritarianism and secessionist conflict.1 Iraq's 2005 federal constitution sought to address this dual risk by granting regions and provinces a high degree of autonomy and allocating oil revenues according to a mix of demographic and historical-grievances criteria.2 Reflecting a classic conundrum of federalism, the new constitution has both prevented and facilitated secessionism, in part because of an imprecise text allowing for multiple interpretations.3 Born mostly out of demands from Kurdish legislators, Iraqi federalism faced repeated setbacks, reaching a point of crisis in 2014 as a result of widespread grievances towards Nuri al-Maliki's Shiite-dominated regime in Baghdad, major tensions over the distribution of oil revenues, and resurgent Sunni militancy following U.S. military withdrawal. By July 2014, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and associated Sunni insurgent groups had taken over much of western Iraq, enacting a de facto partition of the country by declaring the creation of an Islamic Caliphate.4 A breaking apart of Iraq seemed even more likely as the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) gained control of some of its disputed territories — including oil-rich Kirkuk — consolidated its own oil exports via Turkey, and considered a referendum for independence. By early 2015, the situation had returned to a “new normal”: Shiite politicians still dominated federal institutions, and Shiite oil-rich governorates demanded more direct control over oil revenues; the prospect of an autonomous Sunni region under ISIS rule with limited access to oil revenues had become a reality; and the KRG had regained policy traction in Baghdad and continued to pursue self-sufficiency in oil revenues. Focusing on this latter point, this article outlines some of the oil-related consequences of federalism in Iraq for the Kurdistan region and discusses some of the risks of partition in light of South Sudan's experience with secession.
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