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ID:
142649
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| Summary/Abstract |
Narratives about Brazil's nuclear program are distorted by supporters and critics alike. In Brazil, the national nuclear infrastructure is undergoing a period of expansion, with plans to build new nuclear power plants and industrial-scale fuel production facilities. While Brazil's leaders herald the nuclear sector as a triumph for indigenous science and technology, foreigners view the nuclear program as a dangerous legacy of the military regime. This discrepancy becomes even more apparent in discussions about the ongoing construction of Brazil's first nuclear powered submarine. Brazil's military touts the submarine as a symbol of political status, economic growth, and military might. But from abroad, the military's involvement in nuclear development is considered unnecessary, worrisome, and even irresponsible. These narratives—often incomplete or selective—have polarized discussions about Brazil's nuclear submarine program and caused considerable political antagonism during safeguards negotiations. This article works to dispel myths, highlight legitimate concerns, and explain historical perspectives that shed light on some difficulties that can be anticipated in future negotiations.
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| 2 |
ID:
157823
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) has been beset with its relationship with India ever since New Delhi and Washington in 2005 announced that they would strike up a bilateral partnership requiring that the NSG lift longstanding restrictions aimed at blunting India’s nuclear development. India’s history of hostility to the very mission of the NSG has prompted questions and even suspicion about India’s reasons for wanting to join the arrangement. These concerns continue to affect NSG members’ views about the terms under which India might become a participant; to date India has not been admitted into the group. While India has not openly articulated an elaborate official catalog of its reasons, Indian participants and observers have provided several partial explanations for India’s strong desire for NSG membership. Their statements suggest that a number of specific Indian interests concerning India’s nuclear-energy program would be advanced by NSG participation, but also that India’s ultima ratio is its quest for greater international political status. A historical approach to the case also permits the conclusion that India applied for NSG membership following an evolution in New Delhi’s perceptions of its security threats as well as of the strategic significance of its nuclear-energy program.
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